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PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE CRASHES AT
KENNEDY AIRPORT, INJURING NINE:
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR KRISHNA
CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. v. LEE*
INTRODUCTION

The speech and assembly clauses of the First Amendment 1 recognize that critical to a free society is the ability to
express and exchange ideas freely.2 Thus, in recent years, the
Supreme Court has held unconstitutional various restrictions
on speech, despite arguably forceful justifications for such
restraints.3 At the same time, however, the Court has recog112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).

The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The First Amendment is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931).
2 Justice Brandeis stated this principle most eloquently:
1

Those who won our independence .

.

. believed liberty to be the secret of

happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that
freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth; that without
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert people;
that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) ("To permit the
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for
each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought.");
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) ("[D]ebate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.").
' See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (prohibition
against posting "hate speech" symbols unconstitutional as it protects only certain
groups and applies only to certain bias-motivated speech); Simon & Schuster v.
New York Crime Victim's Board, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1992) (law preventing convicted
felons from receiving income from works describing their crimes impermissible as
it applies only to income derived from expressive activity, but not to other activity;
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nized that there are circumstances in which the justification
for restricting speech is so compelling that the First
Amendment's protection of free speech must give way.4
One line of cases in which the Court often has upheld
speech restrictions involves government property.5 For nearly
fifty-five years, the Court has struggled with what standards
should govern whether government may prohibit speech on its
own property in order to operate more efficiently. Initially, the
Court held that government may not restrict speech on streets
or in parks without compelling justification, as those forums
are held by the government for the public's benefit.' Indeed,
for some time thereafter, the Court often analyzed cases involving speech restrictions on public property by considering

government's legitimate interests in preventing felons from profiting from their
crimes and providing money for victims will not countervail First Amendment
protection); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990) (ban on desecration of
American flag impermissible regulation of speech). But see Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S.
Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding regulation requiring family planning clinics that receive
federal funds to refrain from counseling patients about abortion).
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (penalty enhancement
for bias-motivated crimes upheld because of the resulting additional harms to the
individual and society beyond the crime itself); Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct.
1846 (1992) (upholding ban on campaigning within one hundred feet of voting area
in order to protect the integrity of self-governance, a countervailing constitutional
concern); Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (restrictions on certain corporate political donations upheld because use of massive corporate funds can lead to political corruption).
' See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (ban on solicitation
of funds outside of post office upheld); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (regulation preventing political campaigning on military base upheld); Lehman v. City
of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (refusal to accept political advertising on
city buses upheld).
6 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Justice Roberts' holding has been quoted
often:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind,
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets
and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. The privilege . . . may be
regulated in the interest of all; . . . but it must not, in the guise of
regulating, be abridged or denied.
Id. at 515-16. Many years before Hague, the Court upheld a street preacher's
conviction for preaching without a permit, finding that there is no constitutional
right to use public property in defiance of state law. Davis v. Massachusetts, 167
U.S. 43 (1897). But Davis predates the incorporation of the First Amendment into
the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 1.
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whether the purported government interests outweighed the
First Amendment interests, although without settling on one
particular standard.7
Recently, however, the Court has rejected an approach
that focuses on the particular parties' interests in favor of one
categorizing the property at issue as either a public forum,
whether by tradition or for a limited purpose as defined by the
government, or a nonpublic forum. Based on that determination, the Court then examines the restriction under either
strict scrutiny for public forums, or a deferential review for
nonpublic forums. A law restricting speech in a public forum
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling justification if
it is content-based, or a significant justification if it is contentneutral. A speech restriction in a nonpublic forum, on the other
hand, need only be reasonable, so long as it does not seek to
suppress a particular viewpoint.9 Thus, once the Court labels
a forum as public or nonpublic, the case is virtually decided.'0
Because of the importance of this labeling process, the
Court has struggled with the scope of the categories; ultimately, it has narrowed the definition of the public forum. Today,
property will be categorized as a public forum only if it traditionally has been viewed as such or if the government intends
to create it as such. If the government expresses a contrary
intent, however, the Court will label the property as a
nonpublic forum.' This standard effectively eviscerates the
' See, e.g., Greer, 424 U.S. at 828 (need for military to remain separate from
politics outweighs candidates' right to campaign on military base); Grayned v. City
of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (need for quiet near school outweighs right to
protest noisily); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (no government
interest outweighs right to protest peaceably outside seat of government).
' See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (sidewalk outside Supreme
Court categorized as a public forum); Kokinda, 497 U.S at 720 (sidewalk outside of
post office categorized as a nonpublic forum); Madison School District v. Wisconsin
Employee Relation Conm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (town meeting regarding teachers'
union categorized as a "limited" public forum); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense
& Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (government-created charitable drive for federal employees categorized as a nonpublic forum).
' This analytical framework was announced in Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry
Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). For a more detailed discussion
of Perry and the public forum framework, see infra notes 55-63 and accompanying
text.
10 Indeed, in each of the cases cited supra note 8, the categorization determined the outcome. See also Perry, 460 U.S. at 37 (finding teachers' interschool
mail system to be a nonpublic forum is determinative of outcome).
" See Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 720 (government did not intend street outside of
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First Amendment, because the government is empowered to
ensure that little property will be categorized as a public forum, thereby ensuring that most of its restrictions on speech
will survive challenge. As a result, the public forum doctrine
has come under much criticism
from both members of the
12
Court and commentators.
During the 1991 term, the Court once again addressed the
controversial public forum doctrine. In InternationalSociety for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee ("ISKCON"), 5 the Court
considered ISKOON's challenge to a ban on the distribution of
literature and solicitation of funds in airport terminals. A divided Court, in four separate opinions, upheld the solicitation
ban while, at the same time, striking the distribution ban. 4 A
post office to be a public forum); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 788 (government did not
intend charitable fund raising drive to be a limited public forum); see also infra
notes 64-76 and accompanying text.
12 See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 737-38 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If our public forum jurisprudence is to retain vitality, we must recognize that certain objective characteristics of Government property .. . may control the case."); id. at 741
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihese public forum categories ...
have been used in
some of our recent decisions as a means of upholding restrictions on speech.");
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 821-22 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("The Court offers no
explanation why attaching the label 'nonpublic forum' to particular property frees
the Government of the more stringent constraints imposed by the First Amendment in other contexts."); see also G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing
Public Forum, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 949, 955 & 971-72 (government "may expand
or contract at will" the use of property based on subject matter); David S. Day,
The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REV. 143, 160 (1992) ("After
1983, the once-protective doctrine became an outcome determinative, threshold
doctrine that is distinctly speech-restrictive."); C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of
the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
109, 118-20 (1986) (asking "why ...
a government decision not to open public
property for speech purposes [should] negate any meaningful First Amendment
review"); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public
Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L.
REv. 1219, 1224 (1984) (public forum analysis "distracts attention from the First
Amendment values at stake"); Robert C. Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv. 1713, 1764
(1987) ("[The public forum doctrine is presently a blank check for government
control of public access to the nonpublic forum for communicative purposes.").
13 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
" International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992) (opinion of the Court delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist upholding ban on
solicitation); Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
2709 (1992) (per curiam opinion striking ban on distribution); id. at 2709
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from judgment striking distribution ban); International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., v. Lee and Lee v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
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narrow majority found the airport terminals to be nonpublic
forums. Unlike in previous cases, however, the nonpublic forum label in ISKCON was not outcome determinative; the
distribution ban nevertheless was held unconstitutional. Although a microscopic analysis of the Court's various public
forum approaches reveals that the First Amendment continues
to afford little protection to speakers on public property, the
ISKCON decision viewed as a whole has left the public forum
doctrine in a state of chaos. Because the justices took divergent
approaches both in defining the public and nonpublic forum
categories and in their subsequent application of those labels
to the facts of the case, 5 it is virtually impossible for a government or lower court to determine what principles now govern speech restrictions on government property.
This Comment argues that it is time for the Court to give
up the public forum doctrine in favor of an approach that is
workable and more protective of First Amendment freedoms.
Part I of this Comment examines several important cases in
the development of the public forum doctrine, tracing the
Court's shift in emphasis from a balancing approach to the
categorical framework used today. Part II next sets forth the
facts and issues in ISKCON, and describes the myriad of approaches taken by the Justices in deciding the case. Part III
then considers problems raised by these approaches and their
cumulative effect on the public forum doctrine. Finally, Part IV
proposes a standard to replace the flawed public forum doctrine-one that would adequately protect both freedom of
speech and the government's need to operate efficiently.

judgment striking distribution ban and upholding solicitation ban); id. at 2715
(Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment striking distribution ban and upholding solicitation ban); id at 2724 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment striking distribution
ban and dissenting from judgment upholding solicitation ban). The per curiam
opinion merely announces the judgment of the court, and refers the reader to the
various opinions for the reasoning.
" In fact, only Justices O'Connor and Kennedy voted for both judgments (upholding the solicitation ban and striking the distribution ban), and their approaches were dramatically different. See infra notes 100-16 and accompanying text.
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FROM BALANCING TO FORMALISM: AN ANALYSIS GONE AwRY

The skeletal framework for determining whether a speech
restriction on government property is constitutional under the
First Amendment is firmly established.16 Before considering
the validity of the restriction, the Court first will determine
whether the public property is a traditional public forum, a
public forum by designation (often called a limited public forum) or a nonpublic forum. Based on that determination, the
restriction will be subject either to strict scrutiny for traditional and designated public forums, or to deferential scrutiny for
nonpublic forums. 1 Prior to the development of this framework, however, the Court approached public property cases in
various ways, ranging from a balancing of government and
speech interests to a per se rule permitting all speech restrictions."
A.

The Struggle Between Balancing Interests and Formalism

Consistent throughout the early free speech cases involving government property was an attempt by the Court to balance a desire to accommodate uninhibited speech, which is
critical to a free society,19 against the need for the efficient
operation of government." These cases often involved restrictions of speech on public streets, which the Court recognized as
deserving of particular First Amendment protection.2' Early
on, the Court developed a standard for evaluating such restric-

,6 Even though the justices deciding International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992), took dramatically different approaches in their application of the public forum doctrine, all nine followed the
same basic framework.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985); Perry Educ. Ass'n
v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). For a discussion of this
framework, see infra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
18 See, e.g., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (applying a balancing test); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (adopting a per se rule permitting all speech restrictions on government property); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1972) (applying elements of both approaches). The various approaches are discussed below.
19 See supra note 2.
20 See supra note 7.
21 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939), quoted supra note 6.
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tions. Noting that while the primary purpose of a street is to
facilitate movement-thus entitling a city to regulate the conduct of those using the streets-the Court held that when
speech is at issue, "the delicate and difficult task falls upon the
courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of
the free enjoyment of the rights."2 2 Thus, while the Court did
not proscribe an absolute rule favoring speech, it required an
adequate justification before allowing an abridgment of First
Amendment freedoms. Applying this rigorous test, the Court
struck down several speech restrictions.2 3 It soon, however,
began to drift away from a consistent application of the balancing test. Instead, the Court at times used a formalistic ap26
proach,24 a balancing approach25 or a hybrid approach in

' Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939). In striking down several
ordinances that prevented the distribution of literature on public streets, the Court
noted that the city's interest in keeping the streets clean is best furthered by
punishing those who litter, and not by preventing activity involving speech. See
also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (striking similar ordinance).
' For example, the Court twice overturned the convictions of protesters for
disturbing the peace in front of the seat of government, holding that without evidence that the protestors had violated traffic regulations or had caused any type
of disruption, the First Amendment protected the citizens' use of the streets to
express their views. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (protest outside courthouse); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (protest outside the state
legislature); cf Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 562 (1965) (upholding statute banning
picketing in front of courthouse with the intent of impeding the administration of
justice because of government's interest in protecting the judicial system); Cox v.
New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941) (in upholding narrowly tailored, nondiscriminatory licensing scheme for parade permits, Court noted that "the question in
a particular case is whether [control of the streets] is extended so as not to deny
or unwarrantedly abridge the right of assembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion of public questions immemorially associated with resort to public places.").
The Court also overturned the conviction of a protester participating in a "sitin" in a public library. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). With the exception of Justice Brennan, however, the Brown Court seemed to rely on aspects of
the case not involving speech. Compare id. at 141-42 (plurality opinion) (primarily
relying on statutory interpretation, but noting alternatively that the First Amendment is implicated) and id. at 151 (White, J., concurring) (relying on Equal Protection Clause) with id. at 143-44 (Brennan, J., concurring) (relying on Cox v. Louisiana). The dissenting Justices wrote that the First Amendment is not implicated
because a library is not dedicated to speech activity. Id. at 157 (Black, J., dissenting). This reasoning commanded a majority of the justices later in the same term.
See infra notes 27-31.
24 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (upholding speech restriction in front
of jail). See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text. The RANDOM HOUSE DIcTIO-
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upholding a variety of restrictions involving both streets and
other government property. The result was a doctrine in disarray.
27 the Court upheld the trespass
In Adderley v. Florida,
conviction of people who had protested in front of the county
jail. The Court reasoned:
The State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is

lawfully dedicated. For this reason, there is no merit to the
petitioners' argument that they had a constitutional right to stay on

the property....

This statement not only abandoned the balancing approach
that the Court had previously applied, 29 but it rejected any
concern for. free speech. Central to the Court's reasoning was a
refusal to acknowledge the distinction between public and
private action, even though the Constitution very clearly imposes limits on government action that it does not impose upon
private citizens." By equating public action with private acNARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Jess Stein ed., 1967) defines formalism as the

.strict adherence to, or observance of, prescribed or traditional forms." Id. at 557.
In the context of constitutional jurisprudence, formalism is an adherence to brightline rules, although perhaps at the expense of the needs of a particular case.
Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding speech restriction on street outside of school); see infra notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
26 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding speech restriction on military
base); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (upholding speech
restriction on advertising space on city buses); see infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
27 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
26 Id. at 47.
21 See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text.
'0 See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988)
("Embedded in our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence is a dichotomy between
state action, which is subject to scrutiny . . . and private conduct, against which
the Amendment affords no shield, no matter how unfair that conduct may be.");
see also Bowen v. Ross, 476 U.S. 693, 732 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe Founding Fathers ... constructed a society in
which the Constitution placed express limits upon government actions limiting the
freedoms of that society's members."); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 342
(1977) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[N]o governmental
'business' may operate 'normally' in violation of the Constitution. Every action of
government is constrained by constitutional limitations."); Post, supra note 12, at
1763 ("The fourteenth amendment imposes constitutional restrictions upon the
'States' as such, not upon States acting in some capacities and not others.").
That an ordinance restricting speech on public property is public action was
implicit in prior public forum cases. See, e.g., Edwards v. Louisiana, 372 U.S. 229
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tion, the Adderley Court effectively freed the government from
the constraints of the First Amendment.31
Although Adderley seemed to set a clear-indeed, inflexible-standard for considering the permissibility of speech restrictions on public property, the Court later retreated from
that standard in favor of a balancing approach similar to that
applied in earlier cases." In Grayned v. City of Rockford,33
the Court stated that "[tihe crucial question is whether the
manner of expression is basically incompatible with the normal
activity of a particular place at a particular time."34 In applying this test, the Court upheld the conviction of a protestor
outside a school under an anti-noise statute. The Court noted
that "expressive activity may be prohibited if it materially
disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others,"" and that the noise ordinance "punishes only conduct which disrupts or is about to disrupt normal
school activities. That decision is made, as it should be, on an

(1963) (balancing First Amendment against government interests); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (same).
" Although the Adderley Court dissolved the distinction between public and
private action in the public forum context, it also noted that unlike the street in
front of the legislature or a courthouse, jails involve security risks, and that the
driveway on which the protesters gathered was used for transporting prisoners.
Thus, it appears that the Court did consider the special nature of the property.
Nevertheless, it did not rest its holding on such concerns, which are relevant only
if the First Amendment is read as mandating a justification for a speech restriction. Indeed, it is the Court's language equating public and private property rights
that seized the attention of later Courts and commentators. See, e.g., Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983); United States Postal
Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981); Dienes,
supra note 12, at 115-17; Post, supra note 12, at 1724-29 (all citing to or commenting upon proposition).
As the Court's discussion of the special nature of the jail demonstrates, it was
unnecessary for the Court to take public property out of the realm of the First
Amendment to reach its result. Under the Court's previously established balancing
test, the potentially serious security risk posed by a crowd of protesters in a
driveway that is used to unload prisoners weighs heavily in support of upholding
the restriction of First Amendment rights. In fact, the Court has explicitly recognized the unique nature of a prison. In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor
Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977), the Court noted, "[blecause the realities of running a
penal institution are complex and difficult, we have . . . recognized the wide-ranging deference to be accorded to the decisions of prison administrators." Id. at 126.
2 See supra notes 19-23.
3 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
at 116.
" Id.
Id. at 118 (citation omitted).
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individualized basis, given the particular fact pattern."3 6 This
approach is a more detailed version of that previously articulated by the Court,3 7 and places the burden on the government to prove that a restriction is necessary. Whereas the
Court had previously spoken of "weigh[ing] the circumstances,""' the Grayned Court required the government to show the
incompatibility between speech and the regular uses of the
property. The Grayned approach implicitly recognized that a
government restriction of speech on public property gives rise
to First Amendment concerns.

" Id. at 119. Justices White and Rehnquist, who today apply the formalistic
approach of International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S.
Ct. 2701 (1993), and its immediate predecessors, joined in the Grayned Court's
fact-based inquiry.
'3 See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939), quoted supra note 22
and accompanying text.
38 Id. at 161.
Grayned is remarkably different from Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966), which effectively removed the First Amendment from consideration. One
might argue that these different approaches result from the nature of the property-jail grounds versus a sidewalk-rather than a shifting Court. But when the
Court was later faced with a case involving a military base, the Court did not
fully embrace the Adderley model or attempt to reconcile Adderley and Grayned by
distinguishing them. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), discussed infra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
Like Adderley, the Grayned "incompatibility test" has been seized upon by
justices and commentators. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ.
Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 816 (1985) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); United States Postal
Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 136 (1981) (Brennan,
J., concurring in judgment); Dienes, supra note 12, at 112 & 115; Post, supra note
12, at 1730-31 & n.213 (all citing to or commenting upon test).
A flexible balancing approach, although not phrased in terms of incompatibility, was used to disallow the suspension of high school students who wore arm
bands to protest American involvement in the Vietnam War, see Tinker v. Des
Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) ("There is . . . no evidence whatever
of petitioners' interference, actual or nascent, with the school's work or of collision
with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone."); the exclusion
of an interest group from a public meeting, see Madison Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) ("[Wlhere a state has
opened a public forum for direct citizen involvement, it is difficult to find justification for excluding teachers ... who are most vitally concerned with the proceedings ....
[Tihe participation in public discussion of public business cannot be
confined to one category of interested individuals.") and a student group from
access to school facilities, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (public
school's refusal to grant religious group access to school facilities violated Free
Speech Clause of First Amendment because the only proffered justification-that
permitting access would violate Establishment Clause of the First Amendment-was without merit).
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Just as the Court declined to followed the strict Adderley
approach in Grayned, it also departed from the flexible
Grayned approach in subsequent cases. In Greer v. Spock4
and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,4 the Court chose a
confusing blend of formalism and balancing. In Greer, the
Court upheld a military regulation preventing political speeches and other partisan activities within the confines of Fort Dix.
The Court adopted the formalism of Adderley in noting that
the purpose of the military base is "to train soldiers, not to
provide a public forum,"42 and that "[t]he notion that federal
military reservations, like municipal streets and parks, have
traditionally served as a place for free public assembly and
communication of thoughts by private citizens is thus historically and constitutionally false."43 Yet, consistent with the
need for balancing recognized in Grayned, the Court also carefully articulated why a speech restriction is proper: "The military as such is insulated from both the reality and the appearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political causes or
candidates. Such a policy is wholly consistent with the American constitutional tradition of a politically neutral military
establishment under civilian control."" In Lehman, the Court
Under a system of categorization, Madison School District and Widmar raise
the question of which groups may be excluded from such forums without any scrutiny. For example, the Court's holding in Madison School District rested on the
fact that the school district had excluded teachers from a meeting about teachers.
Yet, it is clear that the school district need not have allowed someone to discuss
bank deregulation at a meeting about teachers' salaries. Similarly, in Widmar, the
school certainly need not have permitted an insurance convention to use space reserved for school groups. While these examples are extreme, a line must drawn
somewhere. The issue of how to determine the scope of a "limited" public forum
was raised in Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 788, and Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). See infra notes 63 & 71.
"0 424 U.S. 828 (1976).

4' 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
4' Greer, 424 U.S. at 838.

Id.
Id. at 839. Justice Powell explicitly followed the Grayned incompatibility test.
He reasoned that there is a tradition of maintaining noninvolvement by the military in politics, id. at 845 (Powell, J., concurring), and echoed that "[tihe exclusion
of political rallies and face-to-face campaigning from a military base furthers both
the appearance and the reality of political neutrality on the part of the military."
Id. at 846.
As Justice Powell's concurrence demonstrates, an examination of the competing interests, without considering whether Fort Dix is intended to be "a place for
free public assembly and communication of thoughts" yields the same result
43

"
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similarly straddled the fence between balancing and formalism. In upholding the city's refusal to accept political advertising on its buses, the Court first noted that "the nature of the
forum and the conflicting interests involved have remained
important in determining the degree of protection afforded by
the [First] Amendment to the speech in question."45 The
Court, however, concluded that
[wiere we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals,
libraries, office buildings, military .compounds, and other public
facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks open to every
would-be pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitution does not
require. No First Amendment forum is here to be found."6

Thus, after articulating arguably sufficient reasons for why the
government could justify a restriction of First Amendment
freedoms, the Court concluded by stating that the First
Amendment is not even relevant.
The Court in Greer and Lehman seemed to want it both
ways: although it was unwilling to ignore the First Amend-

reached by the Greer majority. Justice Brennan used his own version of the incompatibility test to conclude that the military's ban is unconstitutional: it is not
"necessarily disruptive so as significantly to impair training or defense, thereby
requiring its prohibition." Id. at 862 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Under his approach,
Justice Brennan seemed to reject any government interests except those that are
physical. Accordingly, he disregarded the importance that the military appear and
remain politically neutral, arguably quite a legitimate government interest.
"' Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1974). A four-justice plurality reasoned that forcing the city to accept short-term political advertising would require it to forego long-term advertising, resulting in a loss of revenues; turn riders into a captive audience to the message; give rise to concerns
about favoritism; and present administrative problems in determining which politicians would be permitted to buy space. Id. at 304. Justice Douglas relied entirely
on the captive audience doctrine, arguing that riders have the right to avoid having an unwanted message thrust upon them. Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., concurring).
The dissent argued that one merely has to avert one's eyes to avoid unwanted visual messages and that riders are not captive to the ads on the outside of
the bus. Id. at 320 & 321 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting). While this argument has
a ring of truth to it, the plurality's remaining justifications are compelling. This
case, better than any, demonstrates why Justice Brennan's view of the incompatibility test is unsatisfactory. See supra note 44. He ignored the justifications of
avoiding political favoritism and selecting advertising that will generate additional
revenues, and voted to strike the regulation because government would not be
disrupted by the advertising. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 312. But in applying such a
narrow standard, Justice Brennan gives short shrift to legitimate government interests.
16 Id. at 304.
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ment altogether, as demonstrated by its effort to articulate a
factual justification for its holdings, the Court nevertheless
was afraid of the potential consequences of adopting a balancing test and, accordingly, removed the First Amendment from
consideration altogether. Because the Court rested its results
on these opposing values, rather than formulating a standard
that reflects a determination of what values are embodied by
the First Amendment, the opinions are confusing.
B.

The Struggle Ends: Formalism Trumps Speech

Ultimately, the categorical language in Adderley, Greer
and Lehman won out. Today, the Court does not consider the
nature of the competing interests, but only the intended purpose of the forum.47 While these three cases reasonably could
have been decided the same way under either a formalistic or
balancing approach, the formalistic approach-which at best
lessens the importance of speech, and at worst ignores speech
altogether-yields incorrect results in some of the more difficult cases decided recently.4"

41 See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1985) (upholding government's decision to deny certain charities access to a charitable fund drive because the government did not intend to create a public forum
in which any charity could participate).
"' See infra notes 55-77 and accompanying text. In his dissent in Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 328 (1976), Justice Brennan prophetically warned:
Realizing that the permissibility of a certain form of public expression at
a given locale may differ depending on whether it is asked if the locale
is a public forum or if the form of expression is compatible with the
activities occurring at the locale, it becomes apparent that there is need
for a flexible approach. Otherwise, with the rigid characterization of a
given locale as not a public forum, there is the danger that certain forms
of public speech at the locale may be suppressed, even though they are
basically compatible with the activities otherwise occurring at the locale.
Id. at 860 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although his assessment is correct, Justice
Brennan's proposed approach-considering only those government interests that are
physical in nature-is as extreme as the one he fears. See supra notes 44-45.
One might argue that the liberal justices, particularly Justice Brennan, were
happy to categorize in early cases, until the conservative justices began to use
categorization to uphold speech restrictions. It is true, in a sense, that the early
cases involved categorization; Hague's "streets and parks" provide an example. See
supra note 6. It is also true that Justice Brennan would like to have employed a
categorization analysis, but eventually gave it up. Compare Lehman, 418 U.S. at
313 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("More recently, the Court has added state capitol
grounds to the list of public forums.") with Greer, 424 U.S. at 858 (Brennan, J.,
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The bridge between the prior cases and the framework
applied today came in United States Postal Service v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Associations.49 There, the Court rejected
a civic group's challenge to a prohibition on the placement of
unstamped letters in a person's mailbox. At trial, the Postal
Service offered three justifications for its regulation: protecting
mail revenues, facilitating the efficient and secure delivery of
the mail and promoting privacy of mail patrons. Unlike the
district court, which had examined the competing interests
involved, the Supreme Court simply determined that the government had not intended a person's mail box to be a public
forum.5" The Court therefore found it unnecessary to engage
in the district court's "elaborate analysis."51 Rather, the Court
fully resurrected the formalism of Adderley52 and implicitly
rejected the Grayned incompatibility test,53 pushing the First
Amendment aside in the process.54
dissenting) ("[Tihe determination that a locale is a 'public forum' has never been
erected as an absolute prerequisite to all forms of demonstrative First Amendment
activity."). But Justice Brennan's method of categorization was much different than
the modern Court's because his was based on balancing in the first instance. See
Lehman, 418 U.S. at 312 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The determination of whether
a particular type of public property or facility constitutes a 'public forum' requires
the Court to strike a balance between the competing interests of the government,
on the one hand, and the speaker and his audience, on the other."). Thus, while
Justice Brennan did abandon categorization in its entirety in Greer, he never embraced it blindly. The Lehman dissent, like most of the early public forum cases,
rests ultimately on balancing.
49 453 U.S. 114 (1981).

Id. at 128-29.
at 132. The district court found that the civic group's right to disseminate its messages efficiently substantially outweighed the government's interests.
The district court reasoned that the civic group lacked the funds to make largescale mailings and rejected the argument that other alternatives, such as placing
fliers on doors and in non-Postal Service mail boxes or making calls were adequate. Id. at 119-20.
"' Id. at 129. The Court cited to its holdings in Adderley, Lehman and Greer
and, more specifically, to the Adderley Court's comparison between public and
private land owners. The Court went so far as to state that "the First Amendment
does not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or controlled by
the government." Id.
" Id. at 131 n.7 ("What we hold is the principle reiterated by cases such as
[Adderley] and [Greer] that property owned or controlled by the government which
is not a public forum may be subject to a prohibition of speech, leafletting, picketing, or other forms of communication without running afoul of the First Amendment."). The Court noted, however, that it would reach the same result under
either test. Id. at 130-31 nn.6-7.
"' The Court did not need to adopt such an extreme approach to reach its
51 Id.
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Soon after the mailbox case, the Court expressly adopted
the formalistic analysis it currently follows in Perry Education
Association v. Perry Local Educators'Association.55 Under this
approach, a court first must determine whether the nature of
the property is such that it should be used for speech purposes-that is, whether the public property is a traditional public
forum, a public forum by designation or a nonpublic forum.56
The Perry Court defined a traditional public forum as one that
has been devoted to speech by tradition or government fiat.57
In a public forum, the proper scrutiny to be applied depends on
whether or not the speech restriction is content-based. A content-based restriction must serve a compelling interest and be
narrowly tailored to that interest. A content-neutral restriction, however, will be permitted if it passes the "reasonable
time, place or manner" test, which requires a significant government interest, a regulation narrowly tailored to serve that
interest and ample alternative channels of communication."

result. Indeed, Justice Brennan, who concurred in the judgment, noted that the
government's interest in protecting revenues is substantial; he faulted the district
court for focusing narrowly on the one civic association, rather than broadly on
everyone across the nation who would be entitled to special treatment if the rule
were invalidated as applied. Id. at 135 (Brennan, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice
White simply noted that since there is no question that the government may impose a fee for users of the mail system, no different answer is required simply
because the civic association wants to use only part of the system. Id. at 141
(White, J., concurring in the judgment). Neither Justice Brennan nor Justice White
required a formalistic approach to achieve the Court's result.
460 U.S. 37 (1983).
Id. at 45-46.
6'Id. Citing to Justice Roberts' language in Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939), see supra note 6, the Court noted that streets and parks are public forums
by tradition. The Court has never clearly explained in whatcircumstance a forum
becomes public by government fiat.
", Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. For an example of a content-based restriction, see
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (city accepted commercial
advertising, but not political advertising), discussed supra, notes 45-46 and accompanying text. A viewpoint-based restriction is impermissible even in a nonpublic
forum. For example, Lehman would have involved such an improper viewpoint
restriction had the city declined to accept political advertising from only one political party. United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114 (1981), provides an example of a content-neutral restriction. There, the
prohibition of placing unstamped mail into someone's mail box applies to everyone
and is unrelated to the nature of the communication, such as charitable, business
or personal.
Under the Perry framework, content-neutral restrictions are subject to less
scrutiny than content-based restrictions because content-neutral restrictions do not
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The Court defined a designated, or limited, public forum as one
where the government voluntarily has opened the property to
the public for speech purposes, even though it was not required
to do so." In such places, so long as the forum remains open,
the same standards apply as if the forum were a traditional
public forum.6" Any other public property is a nonpublic forum.6 ' There, a speech restriction need only be reasonable, so
long as its purpose is not to suppress a disfavored viewpoint."
Applying the new standard in Perry, in which a non-elected teachers' union was not permitted to use the school's internal mail system, the Court held that only "if by policy or by
practice the Perry School District had opened its mail system
for indiscriminate use by the general public, then [the nonelected union] could justifiably argue a public forum has been
created."63 Thus, the Court sent a clear message that a find-

run the risk of burdening one type of speech more than another. Nevertheless,
because "significant interest" and "compelling interest" are not dramatically different standards, this Comment will refer to all public forum scrutiny as strict scrutiny, without noting this distinction. The Court, however, recently has redefined
the narrow tailoring element in the context of the content-neutral time, place or
manner restriction. It is now a misnomer to refer to content-neutral scrutiny as
strict. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
" Although "designated" and "limited" have different meanings, the Court uses
them interchangeably in the public forum context. For examples of designated or
limited public forums, see Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) and City of
Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S.
167 (1976), discussed supra note 39; see also Heffron v. International Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding rule requiring groups
distributing literature or soliciting funds at state fair to do so only at fixed locations). In such forums, the government can limit the topic of speech, as in Madison Joint School District (teachers' meeting) or the function of the forum, as in
Widmar (use by school groups) and Heffron (booths at a state fair).
"oPerry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. The strict scrutiny analysis benefits not all wouldbe users, but only those who are of a character similar to those whom the government has granted access. See Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d
Cir. 1986). The difficult aspect of designated public forum cases is determining the
character of those granted access-that is, the scope of the forum. See infra notes
63 & 71.
" The Perry Court cited United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981), as an example of a nonpublic forum, relying on
the language in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966), treating government
as a private property owner in the context of public forum analysis. Perry, 460
U.S. at 36.
r2 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
' Id. at 47. The school board permitted the teachers' elected representative
union to use the system, which had been set up to facilitate school-related matters. The rival union argued that the mailboxes had become a limited public fo-
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ing of traditional or designated public forum status would be
the exception. Although the school had opened a forum for use
by a variety of groups, because it had not opened the system to
the public generally-that is, because it maintained its option
to exclude some-the Court found the system to be a nonpublic
forum. As a result, the school, within reason, could exclude
anyone.
The Court solidified and refined the Perry approach in
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense Fund.' Cornelius involved
the Combined Federal Campaign ("CFC"), an annual charitable
fund-raising drive in the federal workplace, whereby federal
employees may contribute money by designating particular
charities. Several charities were not permitted to participate,
ostensibly because they used contributions for litigation and
lobbying, rather than to provide direct social services. In upholding the restriction, the Court found the CFC to be a
nonpublic forum.6 5 The Court stressed that it "has looked to

rum, because the school had granted periodic access to non-school related groups,
such as the Cub Scouts, YMCA and other civic and church organizations. Justice
White, writing for the Court, rejected this argument, finding the mail system to be
a nonpublic forum because the school district had not "opened its mail system for
indiscriminate use by the general public." Id. The Court also reasoned that even if
granting access to the non-school related groups did create a limited public forum,
the forum extended only to similar civic organizations. Id. at 48. Having categorized the forum as nonpublic, the Court therefore upheld the regulation as reasonable.
Yet, whether the rival group must be granted access if the system were a
limited public forum should depend on the objective purpose of the forum. It first
must be determined whether the forum provides access only for matters involving
school business, for union membership to debate policy or for all groups related to
the students' education. Under the first category, and possibly the third, it is more
reasonable to deny the unelected union access. Under the second, it is not. Had
the Court found the system to be a limited public forum, it would have had to
perform such an exacting analysis. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
The Court, however, alluded to what its conclusion would have been without conducting any such analysis. It did not need to, because it found the forum to be
nonpublic. It was much easier for the Court simply to rely on labels, rather than
to examine closely the objective nature of the forum or, better, the competing
interests involved.
" 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
€ The Court first had to determine whether the CFC itself or the federal
workplace in general was the appropriate forum to analyze. It held that the CFC
was the relevant forum even though it was not tangible property, because the
charities sought access to the CFC in particular, but not the federal workplace in
general. Id. at 800-02.
Justice O'Connor wrote for the Court in Cornelius. The standard that she
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the policy and practice of the government to ascertain whether
it intended to designate a place not traditionallyopen to assembly and debate. The Court has also examined the nature of the
property and its compatibility with expressive activity to discern the government's intent.""s The Court further emphasized
that it "will not find that a public forum has been created in
the face of clear evidence of contrary intent, nor will [the
Court] infer that the government intended to create a public
forum when the nature of the property is inconsistent with
expressive activity.""7 Applying this standard, the Court noted

that
neither [the Government's] practice nor its policy is consistent with
an intent to designate the CFC as a public forum open to all tax
exempt organizations ....
The Government's consistent policy has
been to limit participation in the CFC to 'appropriate' voluntary
agencies ....
Such selective access, unsupported by evidence of a
purposeful
designation for public use, does not create a public fo68
rum.

Cornelius emphasized that the government's intent is
determinative of whether a forum will be open to speech. Additionally, the Court introduced a severely altered incompatibility test. Previously under that test, once speech was found to be
compatible with the forum, the speech would be permitted.6 9

articulated in Cornelius-focusing solely on government intent rather than the
objective attributes of a forum-is at odds with the approach she took in her concurring opinion in International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112
S. Ct. 2711 (1992). See infra notes 100-05 & 135 and accompanying text.
6 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added).
67 Id. at 803.
68 Id. at 804-05. The justification-that it is best to support charities that
spend directly on the needy, instead of on litigation which may never achieve its
goal-met the Court's reasonableness standard. The Court also cited Lehman and
Greer for the proposition that avoiding political favoritism is a valid justification.
But how it is reasonable for the government, rather than the employees, to determine which charities should be supported is unclear. Even more difficult to understand is how denying access to some charitable organizations, but not others,
avoids the appearance of favoritism. Regardless of whether one agrees that the
government's decision was reasonable, however, the Court should have found the
CFC to be a limited public forum. See infra note 71.
Although willing to uphold the restriction as reasonable, the Court was apparently troubled by its decision. It remanded the case for a determination of whether
the justification was in fact a pretext to mask viewpoint censorship. Cornelius, 473
U.S. at 812-13.
6 See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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Now, a finding of compatibility does not entitle the speaker to
access, but is merely evidence of the government's intent to
open the forum for speech purposes. By making intent the
linchpin of public forum scrutiny, the Court adopted an analysis very similar to the extreme approach of Adderley v. Florida;70 government regulation of speech on public property is
not subject to First Amendment constraints, except in the rare
circumstance when a traditional public forum is present or
when the government intends to open the forum fully for
speech.
The Court next extended the Cornelius intent test to what
previously was considered to be a traditional public forum-a

70 385 U.S. 39 (1966); see supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
71

As in Perry, the Cornelius Court failed to address meaningfully the scope of

a limited public forum. Considering the CFC objectively, it would appear that the
government had opened a forum for charitable solicitation, thereby creating a
designated public forum in which any charity could participate. Under the Court's
intent-driven test, however, the forum was labeled nonpublic because the government did not intend for all types of charities to participate. Justice Blackmun's
dissent demonstrates how far the Court had gone:
I cannot accept . . . the Court's circular reasoning that the CFC is not a
limited public forum because the Government intended to limit the forum
In essence, the Court today holds
to a particular class of speakers ....
that the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech and assembly, a
fundamental principle of the American government, reduces to this: when
the Government acts as a holder of property other than streets, parks,
and similar places, the Government may do whatever it reasonably intends to do, so long as it does not intend to suppress a particular viewpoint. The Court's analysis transforms the First Amendment into a mere
ban on viewpoint censorship, ignores the principles underlying the public
forum doctrine, flies in the face of the decisions in which the Court has
identified property as a limited public forum, and empties the limitedpublic-forum concept of all its meaning.
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 813-15 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice
Blackmun further criticized the Court for simply labeling the property and dispensing with the balancing. He noted that
[i]f the Government does not create a limited public forum unless it
intends to provide an 'open forum' for expressive activity, and if the
exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the Government did not
intend to create such a forum, no speaker challenging denial of access
will ever be able to prove that the forum is a limited public forum.
Id. at 825 (citation omitted).
Indeed, a balancing approach would yield different results. Once the government has opened a channel for charities to solicit contributions from federal employees, it is practically impossible to conceive of a legitimate interest for denying
certain charities access to the employees on the basis of the charities' use of the
funds. See infra notes 167-70 and accompanying text.
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public sidewalk. In United States v. Kokinda,72 the Postal Service banned solicitation on the sidewalk outside of a post office
and next to the parking lot. Although the Court had previously
and emphatically held that streets are traditional public forums,73 Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of four, held
that the post office sidewalk is a nonpublic forum.74 The plurality reasoned that "the postal sidewalk was constructed solely to assist postal patrons to negotiate the space between the
parking lot and the front door, not to facilitate the daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or city."75 The plurality
also noted that "[t]he Postal Service has not expressly dedicated its sidewalks to any expressive activity."76 Thus, after
72 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
7' Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (Justice O'Connor writing for the

Court) ("No particularized inquiry into the precise nature of a specific street is
necessary; all public streets are held in public trust and are properly considered
public fora."); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (Justice White
writing for the Court) ("[P]ublic places historically associated with the free exercise
of expressive activities, such as streets, sidewalks, and parks, are considered, without more, to be public forums.").
" The plurality also included Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and
Scalia. Justice Kennedy joined in the judgment. Justice Brennan, joined in part by
Justice Blackmun and in full by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented. Justice
O'Connor's Kokinda opinion, like her Cornelius opinion, is at odds with her opinion
in ISKCON. See infra notes 100-05 & 135 and accompanying text.
7'Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 728.
7'Id. at 730. No sidewalk is dedicated to expressive activity; the purpose of a
street is to facilitate traffic, not speakers. Yet, this does not explain why the First
Amendment ceases to protect those who wish to use the street for speech purposes. See Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (recognizing that the
purpose of streets is to facilitate movement, but holding that the First Amendment
nevertheless protects those who use streets for speech purposes). Surely the
Kokinda plurality did not mean to suggest that no street can ever be a public
forum. This absurd conclusion could be avoided by considering not whether the
government has dedicated a street for speech purposes, but whether the objective
nature of the street requires a curtailment of First Amendment activities.
After holding the Post Office sidewalk to be a nonpublic forum, the plurality
reasoned that because solicitation potentially could disrupt Postal business, the
restriction was reasonable. Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote, upholding the
ban as a valid time, place or manner restriction. He did not decide whether the
sidewalk was a public forum, but alluded to his concern that the public forum
doctrine might not be working. Id. at 737 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
Under the time, place or manner test,
the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or
manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions "are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and that they
leave open ample alternative channels of communication."
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Kokinda, only parks and those streets that are indistinguishable from the country's Main Streets remain within the ambit
of the First Amendment.
In Perry, Cornelius and Kokinda, the speech interests were
ignored because the Court focused on how the forum should be
labeled rather than on whether the government's need to operate efficiently outweighed the particular challenger's First
Amendment interests. Nevertheless, the Court provided governments and courts with a very clear, workable standard to
apply. With the possible exception of major streets and parks,
which historically have been considered traditional public forums, virtually any public property must be found to be a
nonpublic forum unless the government intended to open the
forum fully for expressive activity.77 It was against this back-

Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)). Applying this test, Justice Kennedy found significant the government's interest in maintaining an efficient postal system. He found the ban narrowly tailored because it applied only to
solicitation for the immediate payment of money, but did not prevent distribution
of literature soliciting contributions. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 739.
Justice Kennedy used the same argument in ISKCON. Although this Comment later examines the use of the time, place or manner restriction to justify a
complete ban of expressive activity, see infra note 142, it must be noted here that
a true time, place or manner restriction should allow some speech. For example,
the Postal Service could reasonably impose a restriction that allows only one or
two people to solicit, and not during lmich hour and at least five feet away from
the door. Such a regulation addresses the Postal Service's concerns without completely banning a form of expressive activity.
The dissent found the sidewalk to be a traditional public forum, and would
have invalidated the restriction. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 740 (Brennan, J., dissent-

ing).
" The circuit courts have had no problem applying Cornelius to cases not involving streets. See, e.g., Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 903 F.2d 146,
161-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 984 (1990) (finding subway cars to be a
nonpublic forum, because city intended to permit only charities, but not beggars,
to ask for money); Barnard v. Chamberlain, 897 F.2d 1059, 1065 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 496 U.S. 907 (1990) (finding bar journal that solicits letters to the editor
to be a nonpublic forum, because there was no intent to give up editorial discretion); Estiverne v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 863 F.2d 371, 381 (5th Cir. 1989)
(same); Kaplan v. County of Los Angeles, 894 F.2d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 1990)
(voter's pamphlet intended to be a limited public forum for candidates to address
their views). At the risk of belaboring the point, none of these cases required the
Cornelius model to achieve the result; a simple balancing or incompatibility test
would yield the same result.
Before Kokinda, the circuits had split on whether non-traditional streets were
public or nonpublic forums. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Turner, 893 F.2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (street above transit authority a public

1292

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1271

ground that the Supreme Court reexamined the public forum
doctrine in ISKCON.
II. How DOES A JUDGE APPROACH ISKCON? LET US COUNT
THE WAYS

A. The Lower Court Opinions
InternationalSociety of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee
("ISKCON")78 involved a challenge to a regulation imposed by
the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey banning the

forum); Hale v. Department of Energy, 806 F.2d 910, 915-16 (9th Cir. 1986) (road
leading to nuclear testing site and parking area designated for demonstrations a
nonpublic forum); United States v. Nelsky, 799 F.2d 1485, 1489 (11th Cir. 1986)
(ingress and egress walkways at post office a nonpublic forum; sidewalks around
building a public forum); ACORN v. City of Phoenix, 798 F.2d 1260, 1265-66 (9th
Cir. 1986) (busy intersection open to motor vehicles a public forum); United States
v. Bjerke, 796 F.2d 643, 648-49 (3d Cir. 1986) (post office sidewalks a nonpublic
forum).
After Kokinda was decided, the forum categorization of a street depended on
how the circuit court approaches plurality decisions. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. United
States, No. 89-16054, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 15217, at *11-15 (9th Cir. July 7,
1992) (Kokinda plurality not viewed as law, but circuit's own law in accord with
plurality; post office sidewalk a nonpublic forum), as amended, 993 F.2d 649 (9th
Cir. 1992) (declining to follow ISKCON; see infra note 153); Longo v. United
States Postal Service, 953 F.2d 790, 794 (2d Cir.), vacated, 113 S. Ct. 31 (1992)
(Kokinda plurality not viewed as law; unnecessary to categorize postal sidewalk's
status, because ban on political campaigning valid as time, place or manner regulation); United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878, 884-85 (11th Cir. 1991) (Kokinda
plurality cited as law; portico occasionally used for demonstrations a nonpublic
forum, but unenclosed plaza area a public forum). Longo was vacated in light of
the Court's recent decision in Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992), which
upheld a ban on campaigning within one hundred feet of a voting area to protect
the integrity of self governance. In reconsidering Longo, the Second Circuit found
Burson inapposite and reaffirmed its original holding. Longo, 983 F.2d 9 (2d Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2994 (1993). Rather than rely on the time, place or
manner analysis, however, the Second Circuit adopted Kokinda as law-perhaps in
light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in ISKCON-and held the postal
sidewalk to be a nonpublic forum. The court chose not to analyze the fractured
ISKCON decision in any detail.
Finally, there are some courts that refuse to follow closely the intent-driven
Cornelius-Kokinda model. See, e.g., Henderson v. Lujan, 964 F.2d 1179, 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) ("[G]overnment cannot establish the inconsistency [between dedicated
use of property and speech activities] simply by declaring it and by enforcing restrictions on speech ....

The Service's speech regulations, then, regardless of

their longstanding character, do not undermine the evidence supporting our conclusion that the sidewalks [near the Vietnam Memorial] are a public forum.").
78 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992).
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distribution of literature and solicitation of funds at New York
and New Jersey airports.7 9 ISKCON is a not-for-profit religious corporation whose members must perform the ritual
"sankirtan," which requires the members to go into public places, disseminate religious literature and solicit funds.8"
ISKCON challenged the regulation as violating its members'
First Amendment right to engage in speech activities in open,
public property. It contended that airport terminals are traditional public forums, and that the Port Authority's regulations
could not survive strict scrutiny.8 ' Following the uniform
holdings of courts that previously had considered the public
forum status of airports, 2 the district court agreed with
ISKCON's analysis and struck down the regulations as unconstitutional. 3

" The regulation provides:
The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of buildings
or structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with
passers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner:
(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but not
limited to jewelry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing.
(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books
or any other printed or written material.
(c)The solicitation and receipt of funds.
Id. at 2704.
The airports at issue were Kennedy International Airport, LaGuardia Airport
and Newark International Airport. In 1986, these airports served almost 79 million
travelers, nearly eight percent of the domestic market and over one-half of the
trans-Atlantic market. Id. at 2703.
Id. at 2703.
81 ISKCON did not seek access to areas beyond the security gates, and the
Port Authority did not prevent them from conducting sankirtan outside the airport. Thus, only the airport terminals themselves were the subject of this litigation. Id. at 2704 & n.1.
8 No circuit court had held an airport terminal to be a nonpublic forum. See
Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280, 1283 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 987 (1988); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles,
785 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1986), affd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 569 (1987);
U.S. South West Africa/Namibia Trade & Cult. Covn. v. United States, 708 F.2d
760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S. 1124 (1982); Chicago Area Military Project v. City
of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 926 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
' ISKCON, 721 F. Supp. 572, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Lowe, J.). The district
court reasoned that airport terminals are analogous to public streets because they
are open to the public, lined with shops and used as thoroughfares. Therefore, the
court found the terminals to be public forums. This decision was justified as the
Supreme Court had not yet decided United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720
(1990), which requires courts to consider the purpose of streets before determining
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The Second Circuit, which had not previously considered
the public forum status of airport terminals, affirmed the district court in part and reversed in part, agreeing that the ban
on distribution of literature was unconstitutional, but upholding the ban on solicitation of funds. "While recognizing that
other circuits had held airport terminals to be public forums
because of their similarity to streets, 5 the court determined
that Kokinda, the most recent Supreme Court decision addressing the public forum doctrine, had altered the analysis.'
The Second Circuit understood the Kokinda plurality to require a court to examine the purpose of a street before determining its category, rather than label it as a public forum per
se."7 But because Kokinda was a plurality decision, the Second Circuit chose not to determine for itself the public forum
status of the airports, but instead predicted how it believed the
justices would vote if the ISKCON decision were further reviewed." Based on its predictions, the court affirmed the dis-

their forum status. Under Kokinda, the fact that terminals are analogous to a
major street used for general purposes is irrelevant. The court found that the
government's proffered justifications, avoiding crowd control and preventing fraud,
were not sufficiently compelling to justify a "blanket prohibition." ISKCON, 721 F.
Supp. at 579.
"' International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576 (2d
Cir. 1991). Judge Winter, joined by Judge Miner, wrote for the court. Chief Judge
Oakes filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
See supra note 82.
86 ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 580.
85

87 Id. at 580-81. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, 473 U.S. 788
(1985), required this purpose inquiry for other forums. Until Kokinda was decided,
however, the Court had broadly pronounced all streets to be public forums without
engaging in an inquiry of the particular purpose behind the street. Kokinda extended the intent-inquiry to all streets distinguishable from Main Street. See supra
notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
"8The Second Circuit predicted that the Kokinda plurality would find the airports to be nonpublic forums and vote to uphold both bans. The court counted the
four dissenting justices as holding the airports to be traditional public forums and
voting to strike both bans. Finally, the court predicted that Justice Kennedy would
vote to uphold the solicitation ban as a time, place or manner restriction. But the
court reasoned that because Justice Kennedy in Kokinda had alluded to the importance of protecting speech, and seemed to rely on the extreme disruptive effects of
solicitation in upholding the Postal Service's regulation, he would vote in this case
to strike the distribution ban. ISKCON, 925 F.2d at 581-82.
Chief Judge Oakes dissented in part; he would have invalidated both bans.
He questioned the precedential value of the Kokinda plurality and argued that, in
any event, Kokinda required the court to consider objective factors as well as
intent. Agreeing with the district court's comparison of terminals with major
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trict court's decision striking the distribution ban, but reversed
its decision striking the solicitation ban.89 The Port Authority
and ISKCON each appealed the adverse portion of the court's
decision, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari on both
petitions."0
B. The Supreme Court Opinions
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit's result in
a series of individual opinions. Ultimately, six justices v;oted to
uphold the solicitation ban, five of whom found airport terminals to be nonpublic forums.9 A different group of five justices voted to strike the distribution ban, only four of whom found
the airport terminals to be traditional public forums.92 Because the Court was so divided, the various opinions are described separately below.
1. The Opinions of Chief Justice- Rehnquist
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion upholding the
solicitation ban held that airport terminals are nonpublic fo-

streets, Chief Judge Oakes concluded that the airport terminals must be considered public forums. Id. at 582-87 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Oakes's
reading of Kokinda was far too broad. It is the purpose of the forum that must
dominate the analysis.
" Id. at 581-82.

90 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. 855 (1992).
"1 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701
(1992) (opinion of the Court delivered by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and joined by
Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, upholding the solicitation ban); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee and Lee v. International
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2711 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 2724
(Souter, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
This case came to the Court on two petitions for certiorari, and was decided
as two companion cases. The two decisions of the Court are reported separately,
and they are both followed by the separate opinions of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy
and Souter. For convenience and ease of reading, this Comment will refer to each
.
.
(opinion of
opinion as "ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at __
2 Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2709
(1992) (per curian opinion striking ban on distribution); ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at
2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2715 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2724 (Souter, J., joined by Blackmun and Stevens,
JJ., concurring in the judgment); see also ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2709 (Rehnquist,
C.J., joined by White, Scalia and Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
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rums, thereby requiring that speech restrictions be subject to a
deferential reasonableness review. The Court stated that
"[w]here government is acting as a proprietor, managing its
internal operations, rather than acting as lawmaker with the
power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to
the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may
be subject.""3 The Court noted that airports are relatively new
and, thus, cannot be said to have been traditionally used for
expressive activity. 4 In addition, it noted that because airports provide a service to travelers, neither their purpose in
fact nor their intended purpose could be to provide a forum for
expression.95 Therefore, the Court concluded that the airport
terminals are nonpublic forums.
Having found the terminals to be nonpublic forums, the
Court easily upheld the solicitation ban as reasonable.96 The
Court determined that solicitation impedes traffic, which can
cause passengers to miss their flights. It further reasoned that
those soliciting funds could subject passersby to duress or even
fraud. Finally, the Court noted that victims of fraud, who are
likely rushing to catch a scheduled flight, would not have time
to report the wrongdoers to the authorities.97
Chief Justice Rehnquist also filed a brief opinion dissenting from the Court's companion decision striking the distribution ban." He would have upheld the ban because distribution of literature presents the same congestion problem as
solicitation. The ban, therefore, is similarly a reasonable regulation of a nonpublic forum.99

13 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2705 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., upholding the solicitation ban).
94 Id. at 2706.
9 Id. at 2707. ISKCON had argued that because airports are similar to streets
both in appearance, as they are lined with shops and restaurants, and in function,
as people are traveling from one point to another, they therefore should be treated
as such for First Amendment purposes. The Court rejected this argument by stating that "[alithough many airports have expanded their function beyond merely
contributing to efficient air travel, few have included among their purposes the
designation of a forum for solicitation and distribution activities." Id. at 2708.
96 Id. at 2708.
7 Id.
"s Justices White, Scalia and Thomas joined in the Chief Justice's dissent.
Justice O'Connor, who had joined the Chief Justice in upholding the solicitation
ban, voted to strike the distribution ban. See ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2711.
"' ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2710 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting from the
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2. The Opinion of Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court that airports are
nonpublic forums and voted to uphold the solicitation ban.'0 0
Like the majority, Justice O'Connor applied an intent-based inquiry and determined that neither the tradition nor the purpose of airports has been to provide a forum for expression.'
However, Justice O'Connor took a different approach to assessing the reasonableness of the restrictions than had Chief JusAs a result, she voted to strike the distribution
tice Rehnquist.
02
ban.

While Justice O'Connor agreed with the Court that the
solicitation ban was reasonable in order to prevent congestion
and potential fraud, she nevertheless found the ban on distribution to be unreasonable, largely due to the presence of shops
and restaurants. 3 She noted that distributing literature, unlike solicitation, does not force people to stop and reasoned
that "[w]ith the possible exception of avoiding litter, it is difficult to point to any problems intrinsic in the act of leafletting
that would make it naturally incompatible with a large, multipurpose forum such as those at issue here." °4 She then reiterated, "[b]ecause I cannot see how peaceful pamphleteering is
incompatible with the multipurpose environment of the Port
Authority airports, I cannot accept that a total ban on that
activity is reasonable without an explanation as to why such a
restriction preserves the property for the several uses to which

decision to strike the distribution ban).
'0' ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2711 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Indeed, Justice
O'Connor joined Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion upholding the solicitation ban.
1
Id. at 2711.
102 Id. at 2713.
10 Justice O'Connor wrote:
[TIhe wide range of activities promoted by the Port Authority is no more
directly related to facilitating air travel than are the types of activities in
which ISKCON wishes to engage. In my view, the Port Authority is
operating a shopping mall as well as an airport. The reasonableness
inquiry, therefore, is not whether the restrictions on speech are consistent
with preserving the property for air travel, but whether they are reasonably related to maintaining the multipurpose environment that the Port
Authority has deliberately created.
Id. at 2713 (citations omitted).
104 Id.
at 2714 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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it has been put."'0 5
3.

The Opinion of Justice Kennedy

Justice Kennedy, like Justice O'Connor, voted to uphold
the ban on solicitation and to strike the ban on distribu0 6 But the similarity ends there. Disagreeing with the
tion."
intent-based inquiry followed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor, Justice Kennedy proclaimed, "[o]ur public
forum doctrine ought not to be a jurisprudence of categories
rather than ideas or convert what once was an analysis protective of expression into one which grants the government authority to restrict speech by fiat." 10 7 He criticized the Court's
analysis for leaving the government with the constitutional authority to limit speech merely by articulating a non-speech
purpose, and reminded the Court that the First Amendment is
a limit on government power.' He further stressed that the
public forum doctrine should preserve the right to speak where
the property is suitable for expression, and that the
government's purpose cannot be determinative, otherwise all
streets would cease to be public forums.0 9 Moreover, Justice
Kennedy discussed modern society's particular need for a less
rigid approach:
In a country where most citizens travel by automobile, and parks all
too often become locales for crime rather than social intercourse, our
failure to recognize the possibility that new types of government
speech will lead to a serious
property may be appropriate forums for
110
curtailment of our expressive activity.

Justice Kennedy proposed a new labeling test which would
focus on "the actual, physical characteristics and uses of the
property," rather than the intended use, and would consider
the compatibility between the forum and speech."' Under
10 Id. (citations omitted).
106 112 S. Ct. at 2715 (opinion
107

of Kennedy, J.).

Id.

Id. at 2716.
'09 Id. at 2717.
110 Id.
...Id. at 2716-18. Justice Kennedy wrote:
If the objective, physical characteristics of the property at issue and the
actual public access and uses which have been permitted by the government indicate that expressive activity would be appropriate and compati"I
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this test, various factors would be important, including the
physical characteristics of the forum, whether the government
had permitted broad access to the property and whether expressive activity would tend to interfere with the uses of the
forum in a significant way. In making the determination, Justice Kennedy would consider expression in general, rather than
the particular expression at issue."2
Applying this new test, Justice Kennedy concluded that
airport terminals are public forums because they are similar to
public streets in terms of characteristics, access and the ability
to control problems created by those using the terminals for
speech purposes with time, place or manner regulations. Having found the terminals to be public forums, Justice Kennedy
carefully scrutinized the validity of the restrictions. He reasoned that a complete ban on distribution of literature-an
activity that lies at the heart of the First Amendment--did not
further a sufficiently significant government interest. Therefore, he found the ban to be unconstitutional." 3 At the same
time, however, Justice Kennedy voted to uphold the ban on solicitation of funds as a valid time, place or manner restriction
because the restriction is directed only at the immediate exchange of money, rather than all solicitation." 4 He explained
that the regulation "does not burden any broader category of
speech... than is the source of the evil sought to be avoid-

ble with those uses, the property is a public forum ... . Courts must
also consider the availability of reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions in undertaking this compatibility analysis. The possibility of
some theoretical inconsistency between expressive activities and the
property's uses should not bar a finding of a public forum, if those inconsistencies can be avoided through simple and permitted regulations.
Id. at 2718.
For example, Justice Kennedy would ask whether speech activities in
11 Id.
general are compatible with airport terminals, rather than whether solicitation or
distribution in particular is compatible with the terminals. Thus, the airport terminals will be labeled once for all expressive activity. If a different form of expression arises in a later case, the labeling process has already been completed.
"' Justices Blackmun, Stevens and Souter joined this portion of Justice
Kennedy's opinion.
114 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2721 (opinion of Kennedy, J.). The statute is quoted
supra note 79. A time, place or manner restriction must be content-neutral, must
be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and must leave
open ample alternative channels of communication. See supra note 76. No other
justice joined Justice Kennedy in his discussion of the solicitation ban.
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ed."15 Further, Justice Kennedy noted that the ISKCON
members could continue to explain their message and distribute preaddressed envelopes as a means of solicitation. Therefore, the regulation provided for ample alternative channels of
communication." 6
4. The Opinion of Justice Souter
Justice Souter concurred in the judgment striking the ban
on distribution, but dissented from the decision to uphold the
ban on solicitation. 1 7 He joined in the portion of Justice
Kennedy's opinion criticizing the Court's present use of the
public forum doctrine and proposing a new labeling test. Further, Justice Souter added that if history must be at the center
of the Court's analysis-ignoring the fact that city streets are
not the only focus of community life-the Court "might as well
abandon the public forum doctrine altogether."1l '
Justice Souter agreed with Justices Kennedy and
O'Connor that the peaceful distribution of literature is compatible with airport terminals and, therefore, cannot be banned.
Justice Souter also determined, however, that the solicitation
ban was unconstitutional, disagreeing that the ban passed as a
time, place or manner restriction. In support of his conclusion,
Justice Souter cited cases in which the Court had disallowed a
complete ban on solicitation in spite of the government's legitimate need to prevent fraud or duress."' He also questioned
' ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2722 (opinion of Kennedy, J.).
...Justice Kennedy also determined that the sale of literature

cannot be

banned. Id. at 2723. He reasoned that the government's interest in banning the
sale of literature is much less important than that of banning solicitation, and
found the ban to be less than narrowly tailored because it does not restrict only
the immediate receipt of funds. He also noted that the sale of literature must
have the broadest First Amendment protection.
Interestingly, the per curiam opinion announcing the judgment striking the
ban on distribution makes no mention of the sale portion of the same statute. See
ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2710. Further, the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice O'Connor and the lower courts also fail to address anything more than
distribution and solicitation. It is unclear that ISKCON even attempted to sell
literature, and Justice Kennedy may have addressed this issue solely for the sake
of completeness.
11 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2724 (opinion of Souter, J.). Justices Blackmun and
Stevens joined in Justice Souter's opinion.
"a Id.
119

See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens For A Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636
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the significance of the purported interest as there was no evidence of fraud in the record. Finally, Justice Souter concluded
that regardless of the adequacy of the government interests,
the ban was not sufficiently tailored to those interests to survive as a time, place or manner regulation. 2 ' He noted that
people can easily walk by, no matter how insistent those soliciting may be, and that vigorous enforcement of anti-fraud legislation would provide a less restrictive means of dealing with
that problem.' Additionally, Justice Souter did not find handing out preaddressed envelopes to be an ample alternative
channel of communication. 22
III. A FAILED PUBLIC FoRuM DOCTRINE
ISKCON leaves lower courts, governments and, most importantly, anyone who hopes to disseminate a message with an
unworkable doctrine that essentially abandons the First
Amendment. Before ISKCON, an unsatisfactory public forum
doctrine seemed to be firmly in place. First, a court ascertained
the intent of the government. Unless the government intended
to open a forum fully for speech purposes, the forum was designated as nonpublic. Then, regulations of nonpublic forums
were subject to a deferential review, while regulations of public
forums were subject to strict scrutiny."2 The only arguable
benefit of the doctrine was that it provided a clear, bright-line
rule; there was little room for individual judges or justices to
impose their own preferences.' 24 The ISKCON decision, however, leaves the public forum doctrine in disarray, because the
Court was unable to agree on any consistent application of the
doctrine. Further, while it is difficult to articulate any underlying principle of the public forum doctrine after ISKCON, it
seems clear that a majority of the Court will continue to avoid
giving fair consideration to the First Amendment interests at
stake.

(1980); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 792 (1987).
120 ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2725-26 (opinion of Souter, J.).
1.1 Id. at 2726.
2 Id. at 2727.
" See supra notes 55-76 and accompanying text.

124 That is, there was little room for judges or justices to consider First Amendment interests.
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A. Avoiding the Mandate of the FirstAmendment
Although the justices approached the public forum doctrine
in different ways, most of the approaches ultimately ignore the
First Amendment. There are two opportunities to do so: when
determining the status of the forum (the labeling process) and
in the subsequent analysis of the legitimacy of the regulation
(the application stage). Unfortunately, a majority of the justices ignore the First Amendment at each stage.
1. Labeling the Forum
A majority of the Court follows the intent-based inquiry
2
That is, a forum will
set forth in Cornelius and Kokinda."'
be labeled as nonpublic unless the government intended to
open the forum fully for speech. Because all public property
except traditional Main Street must be subjected to this analysis, only Main Street ultimately will be protected by the First
Amendment. The Court's analysis dates back to Adderley v.
Florida,126 which held that the First Amendment does not
prevent the government from denying speakers access to public
property.127 Under this unprotective standard, the Court was
1" See ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2705-07 (opinion of Rehnquist, C.J., joined by'

White, O'Connor, Scalia and Thomas, JJ., upholding the solicitation ban) and id.
at 2711-13 (opinion of O'Connor, J.).
126 385 U.S. 39 (1966); see supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
" Curiously, the Court fully endorsed a distinction only occasionally invoked in
public forum doctrine analysis: the Court differentiated between government-asproprietor and government-as-lawmaker. See ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2705 (opinion
of Rehnquist, C.J.); see also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990);
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303 (1974). This distinction is as
meaningless as the public forum label itself, because only the Court can define it,
and does so in such a way as to avoid consideration of the First Amendment
values at stake. Perhaps one can argue that the distinction is clear for forums
such as advertising space on buses, see Lehman, an army base, see Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), and even airport terminals, see ISKCON, because the
government is running a business in such instances. But the distinction is impossible to apply in other situations. For example, the government is neither managing its internal operations nor exercising its power to license or regulate on the
street in front of a state legislature. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229
(1963). Similarly, at a town meeting to discuss teachers' salaries, it is unclear
whether the government acts as lawmaker as it is determining how to spend tax
dollars on education, or proprietor as it is managing the schools. See Madison Sch.
Dist. v. Wisconsin Employee Relation Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). In both Edwards and Madison School District, the speech restrictions were held unconstitu-

1993]

PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE CRASHES

correct to reject ISKCON's argument that airport terminals are
similar to public streets because the only relevant question is
whether airport terminals are intended to provide a forum for
speech purposes; the objective nature of the forum is not part
of the analysis."' The Court's analysis is perfectly circular.
The answer to the question "does the Constitution permit particular government conduct?" is "yes, if the government intends
for the Constitution to permit that conduct." Thus, government
may remove itself from the constraints of the First Amendment merely by articulating its intent to do so.
In contrast, Justices Kennedy, Blackmun, Stevens and
Souter would adopt a labeling approach that fully considers
First Amendment interests. Their approach incorporates the
incompatibility test, which the Court had previously rejected,'29 into the labeling process. Under that test, the government must meet a difficult burden in convincing the Court that
its property is a nonpublic forum. Because the forum's objective attributes rather than the government's intent determines
the label, a government may be forced to allow speech regardless of its attempt to restrain speech to some extent. Thus,
Justices Kennedy and Souter's approach to labeling would
bring the First Amendment back into the analysis. 3 ' Theirs,
however, is only a minority view.

tional. Finally, how does one classify the CFC in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985)? Just as the public forum doctrine can
be manipulated to suit the Court's ends, so can the proprietor/lawmaker distinction. It adds nothing to the analysis. Further, even if the government is acting as
proprietor, the Court never explained why in such situations the Constitution
should suddenly cease to act as a limit on the government's ability to restrict
people's rights. See supra note 30.
...To the extent that Cornelius and Kokinda did leave room for a de minimis
consideration of objective factors, see infra note 135, Chief Justice Rehnquist's
standard eliminates such consideration.
" See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453
U.S. 114, 130 n.6 (1981).
13' In fact, had Justice Kennedy expressed these views in United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), in which a 4-1-4 Court left the direction of the
public forum doctrine uncertain, he would have provided that elusive fifth vote for
a much-needed rebirth of this doctrine.
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Testing the Restriction

Although their approaches differ, a majority of the Justices
also will test a speech restriction without giving adequate
consideration to the First Amendment interests involved. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's approach, first articulated in Cornelius, is
the most extreme, as he applies a deferential reasonableness
review.131 He is not interested in the objective attributes of
the forum, even during the reasonableness inquiry. Instead, he
follows the Cornelius Court's admonition to uphold any restriction as long as it is reasonable, regardless of the possibility
that more reasonable restrictions are conceivable.'32 Accordingly, a finding of nonpublic forum status by Chief Justice
Rehnquist essentially forecloses any meaningful First Amendment consideration.
In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach has the potential to lead to such absurd results that it failed to garner the
support of a majority of the Court. 3 While Justice O'Connor
' This reasonableness review is applied after a finding of nonpublic forum
status. Presumably, Chief Justice Rehnquist would continue to scrutinize strictly a
speech restriction in the rare public forum, as he has in the past. See United
States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183 (1983) (law preventing picketing on sidewalk
outside of Supreme Court held unconstitutional because not narrowly tailored to
any government interest) (Rehnquist, J., joining Court). But see Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 338-39 (1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (dissenting from judgment
striking down law prohibiting display of signs within 500 feet of foreign embassy
that tend to bring foreign government into disrepute as content-based speech restriction in a public forum).
132 In Corne'ius and Kokinda, the Court stressed that "[tihe
Government's decision to restrict access to a nonpublic forum need only be reasonable; it need not
be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation." Cornelius, 473 U.S. at
808; see also Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730.
" Under Chief Justice Rehnquist's approach, not only may distribution of literature be banned-a result rejected by a majority of the Court-but presumably so
could proclaiming one's views. Avoiding congestion is no less reasonable an interest: just as passersby may or may not stop to pick up a flyer, they may or may
not stop to listen.
In Airport Comm'rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569
(1987), however, a unanimous Court held unconstitutional a law banning all First
Amendment activities in the Los Angles airport. Avoiding a determination of the
public forum status of airports, the Court relied on the overbreadth doctrine, noting that even reading or wearing a political button would be prohibited under the
ban. Id. at 575. Given the all-encompassing nature of the ban, Jews for Jesus
probably remains good law after ISKCON. Nevertheless, it is clear that only the
most unobtrusive, private First Amendment activities are shielded from the
government's fist.
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supports Chief Justice Rehnquist's intent analysis, she applies
a reasonableness test with, at least some bite. Indeed, under
Justice O'Connor's approach, the door is open to allow the First
Amendment to reenter the scene, although the opening may be
slight. After authoring Cornelius and the Kokinda plurality
opinion, Justice O'Connor is now concerned with the compatibility of the speech and the forum, and seems to have abandoned the low level of reasonableness that she formerly had
articulated. 134 It is hard to imagine that the Cornelius Court
would hold that, in an airport filled with people bogged down
with luggage and rushing to catch their planes, congestion
caused by people distributing literature may not be dealt with
as efficiently as congestion caused by those engaged in solicitation. 3 ' Thus, Justice O'Connor has added some bite to the
reasonableness standard.
Moreover, within the confines of a deferential review,
Justice O'Connor has revitalized the incompatibility doctrine.13 By considering the objective attributes of the forum
and the question of compatibility in the application phase,
Justice O'Connor recognizes that there are First Amendment
interests at stake. While Justice O'Connor does call for a reasonableness review, it is significant that before ISKCON, the
Court had never stricken a speech restriction after finding a
forum to be nonpublic.'3 7 Nevertheless, it is important to
...See supra note 132.
...While Justice

O'Connor did rely on language

found in Cornelius and

Kokinda, she has certainly pulled back from the inflexible tone of those cases. For
example, Justice O'Connor quoted from Cornelius that "Itihe reasonableness of the
Government's restriction [on speech in a nonpublic forum] must be assessed in
light of the purpose of the forum and all the surrounding circumstances.'"
ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2712 (opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quoting Cornelius, 473 U.S.
at 809); and from Kokinda that "[c]onsideration of a forum's special attributes is
relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation.'" ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2712
(opinion of O'Connor, J.) (quoting Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 732). Nevertheless, to suggest from these isolated quotes that Cornelius or Kokinda represents a flexible
approach to the public forum doctrine ignores the remaining admonitions about the
doctrine and the holdings of those cases. See supra notes 64-76 and accompanying
text.
...Of course, in labeling the forum, Justice O'Connor continues to look to
whether the government intended to allow expressive activity-effectively ignoring
the First Amendment. It is only during the second stage of the analysis that she
is willing to step slightly beyond the narrow label.
" Justice O'Connor's approach, which allows for consideration of objective factors in only one of two stages of the analysis, leads to inconsistencies. For exam-
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stress that Justice O'Connor's reasonableness review is not
strict scrutiny. One can easily devise a reasonable restriction.
Because of the bite, however, Justice O'Connor's approach is
preferable to that of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
It is unclear what level of reasonableness review Justice
Kennedy would apply in examining a restriction of a nonpublic
forum, as he has not yet decided a case in which he found
nonpublic status. Justice Kennedy, however, is far more likely
to find a forum to be public than are Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor. Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy's expanded public forum category is tempered by his extremely lax
time, place or manner review. This is unfortunate. Rather than
allow the First Amendment interests to be considered fully
throughout his analysis, Justice Kennedy considers the First
Amendment only for the labeling process, but then hides it
away during the equally important application stage.
The Court has long defined a time, place or manner regulation as one that is content-neutral and narrowly tailored to a
significant interest, and that leaves open ample alternate
channels of communication. 8 The solicitation ban in
ISKCON was content-neutral,1 39 and Justice Kennedy was
well supported by authority in finding that prevention of fraud
and duress were significant government interests.14 It is the
narrow tailoring element, however, that Justice Kennedy uses
as a powerful weapon against speech. In spite of the seemingly
plain meaning of "narrow," Justice Kennedy argues that a
narrowly tailored regulation "need not be the least restrictive
or least intrusive means of achieving an end. The regulation
must be reasonable, and must not burden substantially more
ple, even though the Port Authority has created a "large, multipurpose forum" and
is "operating a shopping mall as well as an airport," it is not, according to Justice
O'Connor, a public forum. Further, even though "the wide range of activities promoted by the Port Authority is no more related to facilitating air travel than are
the types of activities in which ISKCON wishes to engage," ISKCON may not both
distribute and solicit.
,38See supra note 76.

," The ban applies irrespective of the subject matter of the speech or identity
of the speaker. Perhaps there is an argument to be made that the ban is contentbased because solicitation itself is the content. However, solicitation is more reasonably viewed as a manner of speaking, not the type or substantive content of
the speech.
..
0 See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1987); Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636-38 (1980).
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speech than necessary."4 This is nothing short of a reasonableness standard."' Thus, according to Justice Kennedy,
ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. at 2722 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 798-800 (1989)) (emphasis added).
14 But see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("A statute is narrowly
tailored if it targets and eliminates no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it
seeks to remedy."). Justice Kennedy announced the less stringent standard for the
Court in Ward, 491 U.S. at 781. There, the Court considered a regulation requiring performers in New York Central Park's bandshell to use City-provided sound
amplification equipment and technicians. The City hoped to control the volume,
but not the sound mix, in an effort to respond to numerous noise complaints made
by people who live near the park. Id. at 784-85. Applying the new time, place or
manner test, the Court upheld the regulations. Id. at 802 (regulation "satisfies the
requirement of narrow tailoring."). The new standard was properly criticized by
commentators as well as the dissent in that case for abandoning the "least restrictive means" test for a test that would allow any restriction just short of one that
imposes a substantial burden. See id. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Gregory L.
Lippetz, The Day The Music Died: Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 25 U.S.F. L.
REv. 627 (1991); Michael R. Manley, Ward v. Rock Against Racism: How Time,
Place and Manner Further Restrict the Public Forum, 1 FORDHAm ENT. MEDIA &
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 151 (1991).
Even if one accepts the Ward standard of review as appropriate, however, it
seems that a complete ban on any speech activity cannot be a restriction of a
particular time, place or manner, although there is authority defining a complete
ban as a valid time, place or manner restriction. See City Council v. Taxpayers
For Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 808-10 (1984) (upholding complete prohibition of posting signs on government property to further interest of preventing visual blight);
United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
135 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (upholding complete ban on placing unstamped material in people's mailboxes for financial and efficiency reasons).
Yet, this flies in the face of the common understanding of the English language. A
time, place or manner restriction should be a compromise that allows a speech
activity, but only to the extent that it does not infringe too much on government
interests. Cf Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938) (striking down
ordinance banning distribution of literature "at any time, at any place, and in any
manner.").
Further, the cases dealing with solicitation have expressly held that a complete ban on solicitation is unconstitutional, because its objectives, such as avoiding fraud and duress, can be met in less restrictive ways. See Schaumburg, 444
U.S. at 636-38 (requirement that fundraisers use no less than 75% of solicited
funds for charitable purposes only "peripherally related" to fraud prevention; punishment of fraud and disclosure requirements are less restrictive); Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 795 (1987) (similar law receives same response by Court); see also Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding requirement that ISKCON conduct solicitation at table, rather than throughout fair grounds, as valid place restriction).
Ward abandons the inquiry into the existence of less restrictive means.
Justice Kennedy argues that restricting the immediate receipt of funds is a
regulation of the manner of solicitation, as solicitation for later receipt of funds is
allowed. While Justice Kennedy may be correct, ISKCON would no doubt argue
that the difference between collecting money and handing out envelopes is so dra1
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even if a forum is found to be public, a content-neutral restriction need only be reasonable to survive scrutiny."'
Whether Justice Kennedy would use the relaxed time,
place or manner review to uphold restrictions not involving
solicitation remains uncertain.'" Nevertheless, it is quite
clear that Justice Kennedy's time, place or manner review in
the application stage can be used as a tool to avoid the consequence of his finding of public forum status in the labelling
process. Therefore, there is little cause for excitement over
Justice Kennedy's debate with Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice O'Connor. While Justice Kennedy's approach in the
first stage seems to offer significant protection for speech, the
first stage is meaningless without second-stage protection. Indeed, because Justice O'Connor's analysis allows for some First
Amendment consideration in the second stage, her standard
actually may provide greater protection for First Amendment
activity.14 5
Of all of the approaches employed by the justices in
ISKCON, only Justice Souter's would operate to consider First

matic that a ban on solicitation for immediate receipt of funds is effectively a
complete ban on solicitation. In any event, an example of a time, place or manner
regulation of ISKCON's activities in the airports might require that ISKCON's
members sit at a table at a designated spot away from the middle of heavy traffic, that only two people conduct sankirtan at a time and that they register with
the Port Authority. Of course, these restrictions would apply to anyone seeking to
use the airport terminals for solicitation or distribution; there can be no special
ISKCON rule.
"4 It appears that Justice Kennedy's lax view of narrow tailoring applies only
in the context of a time, place or manner regulation. Justice Kennedy, however,
probably would scrutinize adequately a content-based speech restriction, which
must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
144 In Frisby, 487 U.S. at 474, Justice Kennedy joined the Court's opinion upholding an ordinance that banned picketing on a street in front of a residence.
The Court found that the government's interest in protecting the tranquility and
privacy of the home was substantial, and found the statute to be narrowly tailored
after construing it as applying only to picketing directed at a residence, rather
than simply proceeding past a home. Id. at 483-86. But this case may not be
instructive because it pre-dates Ward. See supra note 142.
Ward is also of little help. There, the Court upheld a complicated effort to
deal with noise resulting from concerts in New York's Central Park. In explaining
its new substantial burden test, however, the Court noted that a complete ban on
handbilling would be too broad, no matter what the interests. Ward, 491 U.S. at
799 n.7. It is unclear where solicitation falls between the parameters of
handbilling and the regulation upheld in Ward.
14"

See infra note 155.
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Amendment interests in both stages of the analysis. Justice
Souter attempts to categorize the forum fairly, and does not
shy away from a finding of public forum status. Moreover, he
also requires government to justify a restriction in a public
forum under a demanding time, place or manner standard.
This is not to say, however, that Justice Souter will blindly
strike all speech restrictions. It appears that he is quite cognizant of legitimate government interests, and will recognize all
of the competing interests involved.146 Although Justice
Souter's approach is in the guise of the Perry-CorneliusKokinda framework, it acts more like a thoughtful balancing of
interests.'47 Only two other Justices, however, joined Justice
Souter's opinion. 4 ' The remaining six Justices apply a reasonableness review of one sort or another. Thus, in both stages
of the analysis, a majority of the Court avoids considering and
upholding First Amendment principles.

...A prickly issue that Justice Souter raises is to what extent there must be a
factual basis to support the government's interests. That is, if fraud has never
been a problem, how can the government offer its prevention as a significant interest? Although in ISKCON there was no evidence of fraud, the Court has long
recognized preventing fraud as a significant interest associated with solicitation.
See supra note 140. Indeed, no one would argue that the potential is not there;
the proffered justification is by no means ridiculous. Further, if the government
must wait for evidence, it might find itself in a position of creating valid regulations in a piecemeal fashion. Moreover, the government promulgates regulations
that apply to all. Thus, even though ISKCON has not committed fraud, another
group using the airport terminals might not have such integrity. The Court has
been clear that when considering these issues, it must not focus narrowly on the
group asking to be released from restrictive regulations, but must consider the
broad impact of its ruling. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 652-53 (1981) (if ISKCON not required to conduct
activities at fixed location on fairgrounds, every similar group, finding itself exempt, could overrun the fairgrounds); United States Postal Serv. v. Council of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 452 U.S. 114, 135 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment) (while granting free access to mailboxes to the civic group in the case
would not decrease postal revenues in a significant fashion, the total effect of all
civic groups that would be exempt could be enormous). Justice Souter did not
explain what type of evidence or how much evidence he would require. It is possible that a de minimis showing would appease Justice Souter's legitimate apprehension about arbitrary government action.
.. If Justice Souter is really applying a balancing test, it is unclear what value
the public forum doctrine framework holds. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined Justice Souter's opinion.
1
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The Big Picture:A Doctrine in Disarray

Although dissecting the various opinions leads one to conclude that ISKCON stands for the proposition that the First
Amendment imposes little, if any, limitation on government
restrictions of speech on public property, when one steps back
to examine the big picture, this thesis falters. Considered together, the various opinions of ISKCON become incomprehensible. The nine members of the Court applied a total of four
discrete analyses' to arrive at two completely irreconcilable

149 If a future case were decided by the ISKCON Justices, four justices (Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia and Thomas) would easily label a
forum as nonpublic, and then apply a deferential reasonableness test. One justice
(Justice O'Connor) would easily label a forum as nonpublic, but then apply a reasonableness test with some bite, using language that echoes cases with a much
more expansive view of the public forum doctrine. Another justice (Justice Kennedy) would seriously consider speech interests in the labeling process, but would
apply a time, place or manner test that gives a government great leeway in tailoring the regulation. And three justices (Justices Souter, Blackmun and Stevens)
would seriously consider speech interests in the labeling process, and would then
carefully scrutinize the validity of a time, place or manner regulation.
Of course, Justice White has retired and Ruth Bader Ginsburg has joined the
Court. This makes predicting how the Court will resolve a future case even more
difficult. Two cases rendered while Justice Ginsburg was a member of the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit are only slightly helpful in predicting
how Justice Ginsburg will approach public forum cases. The first, Grace v. Burger,
665 F.2d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1981), affd in relevant part sub nom. United States v.
Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) was a relatively easy case. Judge Ginsburg joined a
decision holding unconstitutional a statute that prohibited picketing on the
grounds of the Supreme Court. Grace, 665 F.2d at 1194. Because these sidewalks
are traditional public forums-at least they were prior to Kokinda, see supra note
73 and accompanying text-the circuit court properly held that the government's
proffered interests of maintaining the dignity of the Court and avoiding the appearance that justices may be influenced were not compelling enough to justify a
total ban of expressive activity. Id. at 1202-03.
In a much more difficult case, Judge Ginsburg wrote separately to explain
why she agreed that the National Park Service had acted unconstitutionally in
refusing to allow protesters to sleep in Washington D.C.'s Lafayette Park, even
though the protesters had obtained a permit for a seven-day, round-the-clock demonstration concerning homelessness. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v.
Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) [hereinafter CCNV], rev'd sub
nom. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) [hereinafter Clark]; CCNV, 703 F.2d at 604 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). This case, however, turned not on the definition of a public forum, but on whether sleeping constitutes expressive conduct. Judge Ginsburg ultimately resolved that, given the nature
of the demonstration, sleeping was expressive conduct. Id. at 605-06. In weighing
the competing interests, Judge Ginsburg found "that it is not a rational rule of
order to forbid sleeping while permitting tenting, lying down, and maintaining a
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decisions: (1) airport terminals are nonpublic forums; solicitation may be banned; and (2) airport terminals are public forums (plurality); distribution may not be banned. In fact, upon
announcing the decision of the Court, Justice O'Connor remarked, "Now, if anyone can figure that out, they're doing

well. 150
While commentators may find it interesting to analyze the
various approaches taken in ISKCON, the Supreme Court is
not in the business of providing material for law review articles. Rather, it must interpret the Constitution and provide
guidance for those who might be affected by its decisions. Yet,
it is currently impossible for a court or government to know
whether a regulation of speech on public property is permissible. When the Second Circuit decided ISKCON, it chose to
predict the Justices' votes based on their prior votes in

5
Kokinda, rather than treat the plurality opinion as law.'5 2'

Some circuits, however, do treat plurality decisions as law,'
while others ignore them altogether and resort to their own
precedents.'53 Nevertheless, whatever approach a circuit

twenty-four-hour presence . . . . [Sleeping] facilitates expression and should therefore attract ordering rules that are sensible, coherent, and sensitive to the speech
interests involved. In my view, the Park Service determination does not satisfy
that measurement." Id. at 608.
While this case, therefore, does not reveal how Justice Ginsburg might view
the public forum doctrine in general, it does give a hint as to her view of time,
place or manner restrictions because, even in a public forum, expressive conduct is
subject to reasonable time, place or manner restrictions. Id. at 608; Clark, 468
U.S. at 293. While Judge Ginsburg did not apply the established time, place or
manner test in CCNV, she carefully considered the restrictions and, therefore,
appears to be in Justice Souter's camp in that regard. Indeed, the Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the restriction was narrowly tailored to the government's
"substantial interests" in keeping the nation's parks in an "attractive and intact"
condition. Clark, 468 U.S. at 296-97. The Court reasoned that both demonstrators
and non-demonstrators alike must abide by park rules. Id. at 298.
"' Ruth Marcus, Airports' Solicitation Ban Upheld, WASH. POST, June 27, 1992,
at Al.
...International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576,
581-82 (2d Cir. 1991).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 920 F.2d 878, 884-85 (11th Cir. 1991)
(Kokinda plurality cited as law).
' See, e.g, Jacobsen v. United States Postal Serv., 993 F.2d 649, 655 (9th Cir.
1992) (ignoring Kokinda in favor of circuit precedent). The Second Circuit's view is
the most appropriate. A lower court should neither rely on a proposition not accepted by a majority of the Supreme Court nor ignore a decision of the Court.
Attempting to predict a result based on analyzing the various approaches resolves
the inherent difficulty created by a plurality decision.
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adopts, the only way any court can follow ISKCON is to count
votes-a task that may prove quite difficult, particularly regarding Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who consider the
First Amendment during only one of the two stages of the
public forum analysis. The task is complicated further because
one of the ISKCON justices has left the Court. While it may be

unlikely that Justices Ginsburg will vote with Chief Justice
Rehnquist as did Justice White, no one can predict exactly how
she will vote." Such a hodgepodge approach to the First
Amendment is, to say the least, poor constitutional jurisprudence.' 55
These concerns lead to an important question. What purpose does the continued use of the public forum doctrine serve?
At present, the public forum doctrine requires the Court to
employ two separate, unrelated analyses. First, the Court must
determine the label of a forum. The sole purpose of the labeling is to determine what level of scrutiny is required. It is
unclear, however, why the First Amendment should be applied
with greater or lesser vigor simply because the forum changes.
Whatever considerations underlie labeling a forum as
nonpublic will not be lost if the current framework is abandoned; they always remain relevant when balancing the differ-

154 See supra note 149. Indeed, just as ISKCON gives cause for hope because of

Justice O'Connor's more stringent reasonableness review and Justice Kennedy and
Souter's concern with the fundamentals of the doctrine, Justice White's retirement
adds yet another ray of hope. The public forum doctrine may soon see its end.
1" Nevertheless, arguably it is better to have a doctrine in disarray-which
may force lower courts to do the work that the public forum doctrine eschews-than to have a formalistic rule that serves only to push the First Amendment aside. Indeed, courts struggling with ISKCON appear to be choosing either
to ignore the decision altogether or to rely solely on Justice O'Connor's opinion.
See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. MBTA, 984 F.2d 1319, 1324-26 (1st Cir. 1993)
(noting that ISKCON requires merely a reasonableness review for nonpublic forums and finding several justifications for a ban on leafletting, solicitation and
public address in the subway system, but nevertheless holding ban unconstitutional under Justice O'Connor's reasonableness standard as articulated in ISKCON);
Multimedia Pub. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport, 991 F.2d 154, 160-63 (4th Cir.
1993) (finding ban on newspaper vending machines unconstitutional under Justice
O'Connor's ISKCON standard, in spite of government's legitimate interests);
Jacobsen, 993 F.2d at 655 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that "the jurisprudence in
the area is now quite muddied with ISKCON, making it difficult to comprehend
exactly how the Supreme Court would rule in a case concerning newsracks at post
offices, as opposed to solicitation and leafletting at airports" and looking solely to
Kokinda for guidance).
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ent interests at stake.
In the second stage, the Court must examine the particular speech at issue under the requisite scrutiny. In previous
cases-and for some of the Justices in ISKCON-the labeling
will end the inquiry. In such a case, the particular speech
involved is not relevant to the resolution of the case, because
the label is determined with reference to all speech activity. If,
however, the labeling is not going to be determinative, that is,
if the interaction of the particular speech and the forum will be
labeling, then the labeling serves
fairly considered after the 156
little, if any, purpose at all.
Thus, the Court has created a complex framework that is
difficult to define and even more difficult to apply. It allows
the Court to avoid any meaningful consideration of the constitutional issues with which it is faced 57 and to manipulate
easily the analysis so as to burden speech interests unnecessarily. As most harmfully applied, the public forum doctrine is
"" Moreover, one commentator notes that the two-tiered analysis "[gives] the
government two bites at the apple" and therefore "exaggerate[s] the importance of
the government's interests in the particular location." See Day, supra note 12, at
188-89. Thus, the public forum doctrine is more than an unnecessary complexity,
but a means by which the government can win its case.
...The familiar canon that the Court should avoid constitutional issues that it
need not reach is not relevant here. See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., v.
Shute, 111 S. Ct. 1522, 1525 (1991) ("'It is not the habit of the Court to decide
questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of
the case.'") (quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)). That canon applies where the Court, for example, can rest its holding
on statutory interpretation. In the public forum cases, however, the Court is always confronted with a First Amendment problem. It must determine whether the
First Amendment protects those who wish to use public property for speech purposes. The Court avoids this question by playing labeling games. Rather than
consider the values protected the by the Constitution and the government's legitimate interest in curbing those values, the Court attempts to decide the cases by
pigeon-holing.
This type of approach is not limited to the public forum context. The Court
frequently refuses to consider the values protected by the Fourth Amendment
when it can instead wrap itself in a label. See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 111
S. Ct. 1547 (1991) (police chase of fleeing suspect not a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because police did not take possession of suspect).
In labeling the event that took place in this way, the Court escaped conducting a
meaningful analysis of what limitation the Fourth Amendment imposes on police
conduct before an arrest. Had the Court faced this question, it may very well have
found such police conduct to be reasonable. But instead, just as in the public
forum context, the Court chose to avoid examining the underlying values of the
Constitution.

1314

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:1271

hostile toward speech, and when applied by considering competing interests, it is irrelevant. For all of these reasons, the
public forum doctrine must be abandoned.
IV.

BACK TO THE BASICS: A PROPOSAL

The public forum doctrine began with a balancing test,
and that is where it should end. Rather than engage in a twostage analysis in which the first stage exists only to identify
the level of scrutiny and to avoid an honest consideration of
the competing interests involved, the Court simply should
consider the nature of the forum-that is, all of the legitimate
government interests 5 -- and the speech interests simultaneously, 5 ' under a uniform level of scrutiny.
The following test leaves room for any legitimate government interest without ever excluding the First Amendment
interests from the balance. It would provide a simple guide for
a government or court: a restriction on the use of public property for speech activity will be permitted only if the government demonstrates that the speech activity is basically incom-

...Many legitimate interests can be found among the cases that have contribut-

ed to the public forum doctrine: avoiding the appearance of political favoritism, see
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418
U.S. 298 (1974); preventing fraud, see International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992) and United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S.
720 (1990); maintaining revenues that support a government service, see United
States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) and
Lehman; maintaining security, see Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); protecting citizens against being a captive audience, see Lehman; and preventing disrup-tion, see Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) and Edwards v. South
Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). This list is certainly not meant to be exhaustive. It
does suggest, however, that there are many circumstances in which government
may have reason to restrict speech activity. The question should be whether the
government interest outweighs the speaker's rights protected by the First Amendment.
' Like government interests, there are a variety of speech interests, all of
which fall within the gambit of the First Amendment: political protest, see Edwards, 372 U.S. at 536; political campaigning, see Greer, 424 U.S. at 828; charitable solicitation, see Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 720 and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); and disseminating or exchanging information by civic, cultural or religious groups, see ISKCON, 112 S. Ct. 2701,
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) and Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns,
453 U.S. at 114. This list similarly is not exhaustive. The First Amendment protects a broad and diverse array of expression, and these freedoms must not be
infringed without adequate justification. See supra note 2.
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patible with the nature of the forum and the interests of the
government; if an incompatibility can be alleviated by a reasonable time, place or manner restriction, the government
must impose that lesser restriction.
This test comes from various sources, including Justices
Kennedy and Souter's analysis of the public forum doctrine in
ISKCON1 ° and the concerns discussed in many of the earlier
public forum cases. The test is phrased to protect First Amendment interests fully; the government must show why the
speech activity is incompatible with the government's legitimate interests.16 ' Further, it is the objective attributes of the

" See supra notes 106-13 and accompanying text. Although this Comment's
proposal owes a debt to their approach, it is also different in some important
respects. The most obvious difference, of course, is that Justices Kennedy and
Souter use the incompatibility test as a means to label the forum. This Comment's
proposal dispenses with the two-tiered analysis. In addition, the incompatibility
approaches are somewhat different. Justices Kennedy and Souter ask whether expressive activity in general is incompatible with the relevant forum. But because
the analysis suggested by this Comment's proposal yields the result, rather than
an interim label, it must be performed for the particular speech activity at issue.
This approach is preferable because the Court should not make a constitutional
determination of whether a particular speech activity is compatible with a particular forum, unless such a question is presented for review and argued by the interested parties.
Of course, in considering the speech at issue, a court must look to the category of speech (e.g., solicitation) and not the challenging party. While one group's
speech activity may be compatible with government interests, the aggregate speech
activity of those of a similar character might require the restriction. See supra
note 146.
...Several commentators have attempted to propose better ways to approach
the labeling process. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 12, at 973 (suggesting different levels of scrutiny for nonpublic forums depending on whether the speech
restriction is speaker-based, content-based or viewpoint-based); Mildred An, Note,
Free Speech, Post Office Sidewalks and the Public Forum Doctrine-United States
v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990), 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 633 (1991) (suggesting that factors such as forum's tradition, purpose and accessibility be considered in determining label); Peter Jakob, Note, Public Forum Analysis after Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association-A Conceptual Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 54
FORDHAMi L. REv. 545, 555 (1986) (suggesting that factors such as whether the
forum is open and used by many people, who uses the forum and whether people
who use it do so voluntarily be considered in determining label). These band-aid
proposals, however, only would complicate an already unworkable analysis. For
example, Buchanan's approach attempts to add substance to nonpublic forum status by creating another tier of analysis, while Jakob's and An's approaches attempt to beef up the public forum category by infusing it with objective factors.
Rather than attempt to create a foundation for a complex and fundamentally
flawed approach, this Comment's proposal replaces the approach with a simple
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forum that are relevant: an incompatibility will not be found
simply because the government did not intend to allow for
speech. 16 2 The standard also requires that all government interests, including those encountered in previous cases, be considered. 163 It eliminates the varying levels of scrutiny, and
analysis that incorporates the concerns expressed by the other commentators. It
rejects the assumption that the government should be subject to greater or lesser
constraint by the First Amendment simply because of the nature of the forum.
Instead, it requires the government to show why a particular speech activity is
incompatible with the forum, considering the objective nature of that forum.
" For example, in Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at 114, a court
reasonably could have found that allowing civic associations access to people's
mailboxes would be incompatible with the operations of the Postal Service. First,
the government depends on the revenues generated by those who use the system.
Further, civic groups could overstuff the mail boxes, making it difficult, if not
impossible, for the Postal Service to operate efficiently.
In Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 720, however, the simple fact that the government
had not intended the post office sidewalk to be dedicated for speech use is irrelevant. Further, any incompatibility that might result from the speech activity, such
as congestion, can be alleviated by a reasonable time, place or manner regulation.
For example, the government could limit the number of people who may solicit,
designate the time of day that they may solicit or regulate how far from the door
they must remain while engaging in solicitation.
" One commentator suggests that a forum should be labeled as public or
nonpublic depending on whether the government's authority over a forum relates
to lawmaking or managing. See Post, supra note 12, at 1782-83. However, recognizing that "the [law-making/managing] metaphor does not have any obvious analytic content," id. at 1785-86, the author attempts to anchor his theory by stating
that "[i]f government action is viewed as a matter of internal management, the
attainment of institutional ends is taken as unquestioned priority. But if it is instead viewed as a matter of governance, the significance and force of all potential
objectives are taken as a legitimate subject of inquiry." Id. at 1789. This restatement of the proposal is unhelpful. As previously discussed, the management/governance distinction is of no value. See supra note 127. Moreover, it makes
little sense to replace one labeling process with another, particularly because the
Court is likely to manipulate the new labeling process so as to find public forum
status rarely and to avoid meaningful consideration of the values underlying the
First Amendment.
Indeed, there would be much room for manipulation. As the author's own
examples demonstrate, the lawmaking/managing distinction is meaningless. He
would consider the mailboxes in Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. at
114, discussed supra notes 49-54 and accompanying text, and the military base in
Greer, 424 U.S. at 828, discussed supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text, to be
public forums because the government is acting as lawmaker. Yet, one can easily
argue that the contrary result is more appropriate. Logic seems to dictate that the
government is acting as manager of the postal service and the armed forces.
To the extent that it has any meaning at all, one would better consider the
management/governance distinction as a government interest. For example, in
ISKCON, the fact that the Port Authority is running what is undoubtedly an
extremely complicated undertaking should not go without consideration. Neverthe-
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forces a court to assess the competing interests in every
case."M Under this standard, the public forum doctrine would
adequately protect First Amendment interests, while also recognizing that legitimate government interests might require a
speech restriction.'6 5 Further, it provides a simple analysis

less, this distinction must not overtake the analysis. The ultimate question must
be whether the speech activity is incompatible with the government's ability to
operate the airport effectively.
Perhaps the governance/management distinction would be relevant in other
cases. For example, it would be difficult to argue that the government must let
people protest in the lobby area of the C.I.A. Here, the objective fact that the
government is running a business that involves the security of the nation, coupled
with the fact that protest can be equally effective outside, seems to mandate the
upholding of a blanket ban.
'" Not only are the levels of scrutiny for different forums eliminated, but so,
too, are the levels of scrutiny for different types of restrictions. That is, the test is
the same for viewpoint-based, content-based and content-neutral restrictions. However, the fact that a viewpoint-based restriction is arguably more harmful to First
Amendment values than a content-neutral restriction is not lost under this proposal, because the government must explain how its particular restriction, rather than
speech in general, is incompatible with the forum. That is, a government would be
forced to show how one particular viewpoint, but not another, is incompatible with
a particular forum. The circumstances in which the government could make such a
showing are rare indeed-not because of a different level of scrutiny, but rather
because of the nature of the standard itself.
" There are other commentators who have proposed an incompatibility approach, both before and after the ISKCON decision. See, e.g., Dienes, supra note
12, at 121-22; Farber & Nowak, supra note 12, at 1239-43; Barbara S. Gaal, Note,
A Unitary Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly Owned Property, 35 STAN. L. REV. 121, 143-45 (1982); see also R. Alexander Acosta, Revealing
the Inadequacy of the Public Forum Doctrine: International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992), 16 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POLy
269, 291 (1993); Marianne Elizabeth Dixon, Note, International Society for Krishna
Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee: The Failure of the Public Forum Doctrine to Protect
Free Speech, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 437 (1993).
Indeed, this Comment's proposal may not significantly differ in operation from
some of the other incompatibility approaches, including that articulated by the
Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972). The approach articulated here, however, seeks to spell out in greater detail what types of interests are
relevant and who bears the burden, and strives to protect legitimate government
interests as well as First Amendment interests. It is important that courts understand precisely what factors are relevant, and how to assess the competing interests. Dienes has insisted that a careful analysis of the competing interests is required, rather than an ad hoc balancing. He is correct, and the structure of this
Comment's proposal seeks to require such a careful analysis. while Dienes did not
explain exactly what interests aie important, or how his incompatibility test would
function, it appears that he would agree fully with the approach proposed in this
Comment. Likewise, Farber and Nowak have proposed a similar principled approach, called "focused balancing." Although not phrased in terms of incompatibility, their proposal, which seems rather complex at first, ultimately would operate
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that lower courts and governments can understand and follow
with ease; it cannot be subjected to varying approaches.166
in the same fashion as this Comment's proposal. Yet, Farber and Nowak would
continue to apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of speech restrictions, which this Comment's proposal explicitly rejects. See supra note 163.
In addition, insofar as some of the commentators such as Gaal are proposing
an incompatibility approach similar to that advocated by Justice Brennan-who
would require a court to uphold a restriction only where there is a physical disruption, see supra notes 44 & 45-this Comment's approach is significantly different. While some might argue that it is impossible to over-enforce the First Amendment, such an approach ignores the practical realities of running a government.
1" One commentator suggests that a particularistic, balancing approach is "every bit as contestable and subject to manipulation as those entailed in the public
forum analysis." Richard B. Saphire, Reconsidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59
U. CINN. L. REV. 739, 761-62 (1991). He also warns that it "detracts from the
individual decision maker's ability to approach any problem from a larger perspective, to understand how (or the extent to which) each problem relates to other
problems of its kind." Id. at 788.
The first criticism is valid, but misses the point. The public forum doctrine
today side-steps the First Amendment. In its effort to avoid consideration of the
values that are embodied within the First Amendment, the Court uses a labeling
process that is irrelevant to the problem before it, and that allows it to escape a
meaningful analysis. Under a principled approach, in which the various competing
interests are assessed, the Court must confront the First Amendment. That is not
to say that the Court will be forever unanimous; to the contrary, the Court may
still divide in a predictable fashion. Yet, each justice will have no choice but to
address the issues. Each justice must state why the nature of the forum and the
interests of the government sufficiently outweigh the speaker's First Amendment
rights. People will agree or disagree with the assessment, but no one will feel
cheated by a Court that appears to refrain from assessing difficult issues in an
order to achieve a desired result. For a similar response, see Farber & Nowak,
supra note 12, at 1244-45; see also GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1007
(12th ed. 1991). Professor Gunther noted that "balancing opinions, in addition to
being arguably more candid [than opinions that categorize] in disclosing competing
interests, can provide guidance." Id. He approved of Justice Harlan's view that
balancing is a "'mandate to perceive every free speech interest in a situation and
to scrutinize every justification for a restriction of individual liberty' ....

[H]e

strove for unifying principles that might guide future decisions." Id. n.23 (quoting
Gerald Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of
Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001 (1972)).
The second criticism-that balancing detracts from the decisionmaker's ability
to approach problems from a larger perspective-is simply incorrect. There will
always be a larger picture. For one thing, there is already a wealth of precedent.
In each public forum case, the Court has articulated government interests and
concerns. Further, the Court must decide these and all speech cases by considering
what protection the First Amendment provides a free society. Indeed, today, it is
nearly impossible to reconcile the public forum cases with other First Amendment
cases, see supra notes 2-4, as the Court does not consider the broad constitutional
issues raised in public forum cases. This Comment's proposal would bring the public forum cases more in line with "other problems of its kind."
Finally, it must be noted that insofar as some might prefer bright-line rules
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Applying this standard to Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De6 the Court would
fense & Education Fund6 ' and ISKCON,"'
have reached different results.'69 In Cornelius, the Court
found the CFC, a charitable drive in the federal workplace, to
be a nonpublic forum and upheld the exclusion of certain charities as reasonable. Under the proposed standard, it cannot be
said that allowing the NAACP to participate in a governmentadministered charitable drive is incompatible with the drive.
The government had argued that money is better spent if used
directly for the food and welfare needs of the poor, rather than
for litigation and lobbying. However, this type of value judgment is best made by the federal employee who chooses which
charities to designate for contribution. To silence the message
limits the employees' opportunity to make an informed decision. Further, the government's desire to avoid the appearance
of political favoritism certainly is not well served by excluding
particular organizations; a non-discriminatory selection process
would much better avoid the appearance of favoritism. 7 ' Fi-

because they are simple to apply and keep judicial activists in check, the public
forum doctrine has not been successful. The fractured decisions in International
Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2701 (1992), and United
States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990), make that much clear. Both cases offer a
myriad of approaches. Further, the conservative activists have created a circular
intent-based inquiry that has eviscerated the First Amendment. Since there is
always a risk that justices might approach a problem so as to achieve a particular
result, it is better that they operate in a system that demands a consideration of
the relevant issues and requires an articulation of the resulting conclusion, rather
than one that allows them to ignore the Constitution.
U 473 U.S. 788 (1985). For a discussion of the facts and reasoning, see supra
notes 64-71 and accompanying text.
" 112 S. Ct. at 2701. For a discussion of the facts and reasoning, see supra
notes 78-122 and accompanying text.
'. As demonstrated previously, the Court could have reached the same result
in each of the cases decided before the formal adoption of the present framework
by examining the competing interests. See supra notes 31, 44-45 & 162. Further,
it has already been noted that Kokinda would have been better decided by requiring the government to adopt reasonable time, place or manner restrictions. See
supra notes 76 & 162. This Comment examines Cornelius and ISKCON under the
proposed approach because the reasoning and results in those cases were particularly unsatisfactory.
"' Indeed, on remand, the district court granted a preliminary injunction
against excluding the NAACP and other plaintiffs, finding that the they were
likely to succeed on the merits of proving viewpoint discrimination. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund v. Homer, 636 F. Supp. 762, 769-70 (D.D.C.), vacated as
moot, 795 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Thus, the government created, rather than
avoided the appearance of partiality through its actions.
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nally, if the government must limit the number of participants
for administrative reasons, it should do so by adopting a fair,
non-discriminatory system, such as a lottery or first-come-firstserved basis. This approach is faithful to the First Amendment
and achieves a much more rational result than that achieved
by the Court under the current mode of analysis.
Similarly, a more rational result would have been achieved
in ISKCON had the Court followed the proposed approach. The
government interests are somewhat more legitimate in
ISKCON than they were in Cornelius, as congestion and fraud
are potential problems. Further, the government is indeed
running an airport, which involves getting thousands of people
on and off planes every day. Indeed, an onslaught of people
roaming about the airport terminals handing out literature
and soliciting funds could be terribly disruptive. Yet, the government has opened the forum for many activities other than
travel. In so doing, the government has implicitly expressed a
willingness to withstand a certain amount of disruption. More
importantly, the proposed standard requires that the availability of reasonable time, place or manner restrictions also be
considered. If such regulations were imposed,' it would be

171 As mentioned, the Port Authority might require that the Krishna members
(and other potential speakers) sit at a table at a designated spot away from the
heavy traffic, that only two people conduct the speech activities at one time, and
that the speakers register with the Port Authority. See supra note 142. This would
solve the congestion problem and simplify prevention of fraud. Another example is
the course taken by the City of Houston. At Houston Intercontinental Airport,
among the frequent public-address announcements is one stating:
At Houston Intercontinental Airport, certain individuals and organizations
have registered to solicit contributions for various causes. This activity is
protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution.
However, the City of Houston and Airport Management does [sic] not
endorse this activity. You are under no obligation to contribute to this
individual or organization.
Houston Intercontinental Airport, Public Service Announcement (1993) (transcript
on file with the Brooklyn Law Review). While this statement is not entirely accurate (solicitation is not protected by the First Amendment after ISKCON) it does
aid in preventing fraud and duress, by informing travelers that they need not
contribute and that those engaging in solicitation do not do so with any official
approval. In addition, those wishing to engage in solicitation at the Houston airport must display a registration permit while engaging in solicitation. Moreover,
they may not obstruct the free movement of or coerce travelers or misrepresent
their identity. HOUSTON, TX., CODE, §§ 9-75 & 9-76 (1993). Thus, Houston has
addressed the same interests that underlie the New York regulations, but without
banning speech.
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difficult to articulate how distribution or solicitation could be
incompatible with the huge airport terminals at issue. In fact,
by requiring the use of such regulations, which could apply to
both distribution and solicitation, the Port Authority would not
with the rather absurd split result at which the Court
be faced172
arrived.
While the facts of these two cases-particularly those in
Cornelius-seem to require the results described, a
decisionmaker who can articulate a reasonable argument as to
why the government's interests do indeed outweigh the speech
interests is free to resolve the cases accordingly. That is the
essence of this proposal: a reasoned, principled decision that
fairly weighs the competing interests is legitimate; a result
achieved through arbitrary pigeon-holing without consideration
of competing interests is not.
CONCLUSION

The public forum doctrine has lived through many stages.
It started as a balancing test, flipped to a per se rule against
affording First Amendment protection, flopped back to a balancing test, evolved into to a confusing mixture of a per se rule
and a balancing test, settled as a complicated analysis that
increasingly acted as a per se rule and finally fragmented into
a series of analyses that yields results incapable of reconciliation. One reason for this may be that the Court has yet to
articulate an approach that gives fair consideration to government interests without sacrificing speech interests. Instead,
the Court seems to travel from one extreme to another. A single consistency, however, is the constant presence of justices
who remain hostile toward speech when public property is
involved.
Ultimately, the public forum doctrine is much less a
means to ensure that government can operate efficiently than
it is a cynical and convenient tool for government and courts to
stamp out unpopular or marginal voices. In ISKCON, a fringe
religious group came to Kennedy Airport and other large airports to disseminate its message and raise the funds that en-

.72Although the solicitation ban is constitutional, the Krishna members may
still roam freely throughout the airport terminals distributing literature.
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able it to continue its work. No doubt many users of the airports were grateful to the Port Authority for ridding the terminals of a minor nuisance. But the fact that the political process
will never operate to protect the Krishnas' speech rights is the
very reason that the First Amendment exists. If the Constitution is to have any meaning, it must protect the unpopular and
marginal voices as stridently as those in the mainstream.
Of course, government also must operate efficiently, and
the First Amendment simply cannot be absolute. But the existing public forum doctrine fails in two respects. By resting on a
premise that government conduct is equivalent to private conduct when public property is concerned, the analysis, at its
worst, fails to provide adequate consideration for First Amendment rights and, therefore, allows the exclusion of far more
speech activity than necessary. At its best, because a lack of
principled reasoning has lead to a multitude of approaches, the
doctrine has reached such a point of disarray that it fails to
offer guidance. Accordingly, it is clear that the Court must give
up its public forum doctrine and begin anew.
This Comment's proposal-an objective balancing approach
that requires the government to show incompatibility-remedies both problems. It gives the First Amendment top
priority by requiring the government to justify adequately any
ban on speech activity, while always recognizing that such
justifications in fact do exist. Just as importantly, the proposal
achieves its results through a simple test that requires no
more and no less than a fair consideration of the values that
underlie the First Amendment, and a fair articulation of the
reasoning that underlies the decisionmaker's result.
David A. Stoll

